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ABSTRACT

The first two chapters of this dissertation are closely related and pertain to small
business reactions to income tax changes. The final chapter investigates the value
consumers place on residential community associations.
Small businesses file taxes in accordance with the personal income tax code
because they are considered flow-through entities. Thus, personal income tax reforms
directly affect the incentives small business owners face regarding employment and
operations. I use the changes in personal income-tax rates during the 1993 and 2001-2003
reforms and micro-level data to estimate the effect of statutory tax-rate changes on smallbusiness employment decisions. I add two contributions to the current literature: first, I
allow for intertemporal tax planning and secondly, I allow the firm's decision to employ
labor to be correlated with the firm's salary expense decision. Estimation of a Heckman
selection model for salary expenses shows that the probability that a business will employ
labor is 1.18% higher when current tax rates increase by one percentage point and 0.70%
lower when future rates are expected to increase by one percentage point. Among firms
that already employ labor, the median salary expense elasticity with respect to current tax
rates is -0.64. These estimates are larger than those reported in previous research because
my model includes future taxes and allows for correlation between the firm‟s
employment and salary decisions. Omitting the intertemporal tax responses biases the
estimates of previous researchers upwards, whereas assuming the two firm decisions are
independent biases estimates towards zero.
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After examining the employment responses of small businesses to income tax
changes, I then estimate the marginal welfare cost associated with the behavioral
changes. The marginal welfare cost of an increase in income tax rates affects small
businesses in many ways. I examine one aspect of the cost of a tax increase on small
business employers: the marginal welfare cost of reduced owner-effort exerted in the
firm. The welfare cost of reduced owner-effort and the corresponding reduction in
reported taxable business income can be estimated using the elasticity of taxable business
income. The elasticity of taxable business income measures the long-run annual
incremental cost of a permanent income tax increase, relative to the prior income tax
regime. The permanent welfare cost of personal income tax increases on small business
employers is $920 million for the 1993 tax reforms and $245 million for the 2001-2003
tax reforms. When small business employers supply less effort, they demand fewer
productive inputs, including outside labor. Any outside labor displaced by the small
business sector must transition to re-employment in the rest of the economy. The cost of
displaced labor is in addition to the costs associated with the elasticity of taxable business
income and is a one-time cost. I estimate the short-run cost of displaced labor to be $10
million for the 1993 reforms and $3.2 million for the 2001-2003 reforms. This cost is a
one-time reduction in welfare from labor displacement when workers are not instantly
absorbed by the rest of the economy.
Finally, in the third chapter, I examine sales price data on Spartanburg County
homes both in and out of residential community associations to analyze the value of
residential community associations. Comparable neighborhoods not in RCAs are
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included to estimate the value consumers place on RCA affiliation. RCAs appear to
increase property values by 2.2% in the sample. I then examine one neighborhood with
120 houses that has a mandatory homeowners‟ association for 30 lakefront properties.
Homes in this particular RCA sell at a 3.8% premium to the other homes in the
neighborhood. This is the capitalized net benefit of living on, and accessing the lake. I
also examine the existing empirical literature on the efficiency of residential community
associations and discuss the theoretical problems of analyzing RCA efficiency. My
analysis shows that the existing empirical research on the efficiency of RCAs lacks
identification and suffers from omitted variable bias. Including a variable for “property
age” drastically changes the estimates and interpretations from the existing literature. Age
is an important variable to include because it proxies for a host of factors like location,
architectural-style, and projected maintenance costs, all of which influence property
values. Omitting age downwardly biases the estimates.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE IMPACT OF PERSONAL INCOME TAX RATES ON THE EMPLOYMENT
DECISIONS OF SMALL BUSINESSES
Introduction
Small businesses are considered “flow-through” entities for income tax purposes.
The business owner‟s wage income and business profits are taxed at the same marginal
rate. Business owners can use their own labor solely or in conjunction with outside labor,
a tax-deductible business expense, in the operations of the firm. Changes in tax rates
affect the firm in two distinct ways: by altering the returns of the entire business entity
and by inducing relative price changes in the production mix between outside labor and
the owner‟s labor. When tax rates increase, the returns to the business decrease and
production and labor demand decline through the scale effect. However, the price of
outside labor falls relative to owner labor, so that if the owner‟s effort can be replaced by
employed labor, the substitution effect may lead small firms to employ more outside
labor.
Small businesses constitute a large portion of the U.S. economy. Roughly 7.5% of
all workers, or 10.3 million people, were self-employed in 2003, and an additional 4.9
million people owned an incorporated business while reporting wages from another job
(Hipple 2004). Small businesses account for a vast percentage of new job creation. Birch
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(1987) estimates that firms with fewer than 20 employees accounted for 82% of new job
creation between 1981 and 1985.1
The effect of personal marginal income-tax rates on the employment decisions of
small businesses is a relatively unexplored topic, yet small businesses account for 94% of
all businesses filing with the IRS.2 I examine changes in the employment and wage bill
decisions of small businesses in response to changes in current and future tax rates when
selection on unobservables is assumed to occur among employers.
I seek to identify the two distinct effects of changes in current and future tax rates
on the probability of employing labor and total wage bills due to the relative change in
the price of owner effort. The probability of employing labor and total wage bills are not
independent decision processes; therefore, a Heckman selection model is specified for
pooled cross-sections from the NBER Public Use File on individual income-tax returns
from 1992-2005 for sole proprietors filing a Schedule C.
The Heckman two-step model allows for the presence of a limited dependent
variable (employers) and correlated processes for choosing to employ and then wage bill
choice. The first step of the Heckman addresses the decision to employ outside labor. I
estimate that a one percentage-point increase in current tax rates increases the probability
of employing outside labor by 1.18 percent, while a one percentage-point increase in the

1

Large estimates for gross job creation by small firms are also reported by Davis et al. (1996), as are high
layoffs. Neumark et al. (2008) report small firms create more jobs than larger establishments but not to the
extent of the Birch (1987) findings.
2
C-corporations accounted for 6.6% of all IRS business filers in 2005, while sole proprietors accounted for
72%. The remaining 21% are mainly S-corporations and a few partnerships.
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marginal tax rate next year decreases the probability of employing labor today by 0.70
percent.
The second step of the model comprises a regression that accounts for selection
on unobservables by firms employing labor, and estimates the wage bill elasticity with
respect to current and future tax rate changes. The mean and median wage bill elasticities
with respect to current tax rates are -0.17 and -0.64, respectively. Increases in future tax
rates make production today more attractive relative to production tomorrow, indicating
that firms anticipating higher future taxes shift production intertemporally.

2

Income Tax Background
In 1992, Presidential Candidate Bill Clinton campaigned on a promise to raise

taxes on the wealthiest Americans. In the aftermath of the election, the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA-93) was signed into law. OBRA-93 increased
personal income-taxes on Americans reporting adjusted gross incomes in excess of
$140,000.3 Married taxpayers filing jointly with AGI greater than $250,000 faced
marginal tax rates of 39.6% instead of 31%. Those with AGI greater than $140,000 but
less than $250,000 faced a marginal tax rate of 36% instead of the previous 31%.
Most tax reforms, like the 1993 reforms, are announced months or years in
advance.4 With rational expectations or perfect foresight, future taxes are known with
certainty and any deviations are random noise. Under the rational expectations theory,
3

OBRA-93 also repealed the cap on Medicare taxes, increased the taxable portion of social security
benefits, limited itemized deductions, increased Federal fuel taxes and expanded the Earned Income-tax
Credit (EITC).
4
The 1993 tax hikes were most likely anticipated in 1992 because the Clinton campaign focused on
increasing taxes on the top 1% of taxpayers (defined as AGI greater than $139,999).
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deviations from the equilibrium path would be random and only occur when tax-payers
are “surprised” by relatively higher or lower tax rates than expected.
Whereas OBRA-93 increased tax rates, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) lowered personal income-tax rates for most
taxpayers. Tax-rate decreases were anticipated to phase in gradually through 2006. Rates
initially decreased to 39.1% from 39.6% for the top tax-bracket and were scheduled to
decline gradually to 35% over five years.5 In May 2003, in an attempt to stave off
recession, Congress passed the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003
(JGTRRA). JGTRRA accelerated the tax decreases previously scheduled for 2006,
making them effective immediately. 6
Calculating the appropriate effective tax rate is not a straight forward process for
business owners. The NBER‟s TAXIM model is useful for analysis on an individual‟s
taxable income but does not adjust for any line-items found on the business schedules
(Schedule C, Schedule E, Schedule F). Ideally, I would like the business owner‟s
marginal tax rate without his wage bill and other business expenses which is not possible.
The correct tax rate for decision-making depends on the particular issue under
consideration: marginal tax rates, average tax rates or statutory tax rates could be the
most relevant rate for behavioral changes. A part-time business owner working full-time
for another firm may be most sensitive to marginal tax rates. Any additional income
earned by the part-time business would be taxed at the marginal rate. Marginal rates are

5

See Figures 1 and 2 for comparison of anticipated and actual tax rates.
See Table 1 for all relevant marginal tax rate changes. With knowledge of future tax changes, taxpayer
and employers can plan in advance to take advantage or avoid any tax changes.
6
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also very difficult to estimate and can suffer from endogeneity7. The average tax rate may
be more important to full-time owners: they receive wage and profit income from the
business; when planning for taxes they examine their total tax liability and potential
deductions.
The statutory tax rate may be appropriate when deciding how many businesses to
operate or expanding existing operations 8. The statutory tax rate is not likely to be
endogenous because the majority of people do not bunch at tax bracket kink points. 9
Statutory rates offer transparency in most cases; it is relevant for either of the two prior
scenarios because it determines the tax liability independent of behavioral adaptations. 10
Using similar methodologies but studying different tax reforms, Carroll et al.
(2000a) and LaLumia (2008) find conflicting coefficients for the contemporaneous
employment and gross receipts responses of business owners to current tax-rate changes.
My novel theoretical framework reconciles the conflicting estimates obtained by previous
researchers. The theoretical models in the previous research predict negative labordemand and wage bill coefficients for tax-rate increases. My model shows this is only the
case for larger firms; small firms may actually employ more labor when tax rates
increase.

7

Marginal tax rate calculations are estimates that try to account for statutory and implicit tax rates as well
as personal and itemized deductions and credits that arise from special features of the tax code.
8
Statutory tax rates are the tax rates listed for each income-bracket in a given year by the Internal Revenue
Service. For example, a taxpayer with the median taxable income of $90,443 in 2005 would be taxed at
three different rates: the first $14,000 would be taxed at 10%, the next $42,800 would be taxed at 15% and
anything in excess of $56,800 would be taxed at 25%.
9
Bunching at kink points would indicate strong behavioral responses to bracket ranges; however, such
behavior is not observed. See Saez (2009) for detailed analysis.
10
Statutory rates may be the first indicator to businesses that marginal adjustments are necessary going
forward.
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Carroll et al. (2000a) and LaLumia (2008) implicitly assume the decisions to
employ labor and the amount of labor are independent. LaLumia (2008) does not find
evidence of increased employment probabilities or higher gross receipts, whereas Carroll
et al. (2000a) do find such evidence.
LaLumia (2008) investigates changes in gross business receipts and in the
probability of hiring labor before and after the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001. She constructs a five-year panel beginning in 1999 and
instruments for the tax decrease by applying post-reform tax rates to pre-reform reported
income. While most tax reforms take place immediately, the 2001 tax reforms were
intended to phase in through 2006 with small yearly decreases. When explaining the
difference in her results and those by Carroll et al., LaLumia (2008) notes “the 2001 cuts
were…more equally distributed across the income distribution (than the 1986 cuts)”. 11
Carroll et al. (2000a) use a two-year balanced panel of Schedule C filers
appearing in both 1985 and 1988 to estimate the effects of the 1986 tax reforms on small
business employment and wage bills. They model the contemporaneous behavior of
individuals reacting to the tax rates of the current period and find that owners are 12%
more likely to hire workers and increase salaries after a 10% decrease in the individual
marginal income-tax rate.
LaLumia (2008) and Carroll et al. (2000a) estimate probit and least-squares
models. The present study exploits the flexibility of the Heckman model to allow for
selection on unobservables in the data to learn more about firms employing labor. The
11

Taxes decreased to 38.5% from 50% for the top income-bracket in 1986. In 2001, the top rate was
immediately reduced to 39.1% from 39.6%, with phased-in reductions to 35% through 2006.
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two data-generating processes for choosing to employ labor and then choosing a wage
bill may not be perfectly correlated, as is assumed in the alternative tobit specification.
Carroll et al. (2000a) simply estimate least-squares regressions on observations with
positive wage bills. My estimates will show the former least-squares estimates are biased
with incorrect signs when the decision to employ labor and the wage bill level are not
independent decisions.13
After replicating the Carroll et al. (2000a) findings, I then extend the literature to
allow for anticipatory tax planning by firms and for correlation among the error terms in
the two empirical decisions. I attempt to account for tax planning when tax rates are
expected to change in the following period. My dataset consists of repeated crosssections which allows for potential changes in the true population due to the legal reforms
governing S-corporations14. A two-year panel focuses only on observations appearing in
both years; Carroll et al. (2000a) report that their results do not statistically change when
including employers present in only one of the years, so cross-sectional data may be a
good approximation to the underlying data-generating process. The minute differences
Carroll et al. (2000a) found indicate their panel results may include a small survivor bias
and would be upwardly biased for tax rate decreases.

13

Carroll et al. (2000a) employ a tobit model as a specification test, but they do not find meaningfully
different results. OLS estimates on a truncated sample may provide reasonable crude estimates for marginal
effects since the truncated mean is still fairly linear in x if the two decisions are independent; however, the
estimates are inconsistent. If the decisions are not independent, OLS on a truncated sample is biased and
inconsistent (Cameron and Trivedi, pg. 540-2).
14
The 1986 reforms made S-corporations more attractive by increasing the allowed number of
shareholders. The number of S-corporations as a percentage of all businesses filed with the IRS has
gradually climbed to 12.5% in 2007 from 6.6% in 1988.
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My analysis focuses on the tax reforms of 1993 and 2001-2003 to avoid
complications arising from the changes to the definition of taxable income that occurred
in 1986. The 1986 reform, studied by Carroll et al. (2000a), changed the definition of the
taxable base as well as marginal tax rates, making it impossible to separate and identify
the two independent effects.15 This is a major criticism of all tax literature using only the
1986 reform for variation.16 The 1993 and 2001-2003 reforms isolate the behavioral
response of Schedule C filers with respect to marginal tax rate changes. 17 The results
presented in Appendix A recreate the Carroll et al. (2000a) study using 1993 and 20012003 variation. The estimates provide a bias range for the impact of the definitional
changes to the taxable-base in 1986.
Taxation affects the production mix of small businesses in many ways. Rather
than simply reacting to current tax rates, business owners are presumably forwardlooking. Many revenues and expenses can be shifted across consecutive tax years when
upcoming tax changes are anticipated.19 Owners can deduct higher levels of expenses by

15

The 1986 Tax Reforms changed the definition of taxable income, or the tax base, in many ways,
including: taxing capital gains as ordinary income, disallowing the deduction of consumer loan interest,
eliminating income averaging, increasing the standard deduction, increasing the personal exemption
amount, further restricting tax-deductable IRA contributions, increasing the depreciation lives of equipment
purchases, limiting the deductions on passive investment losses, and requiring a social security number for
all dependents claimed. It also made S-corporations more attractive by increasing the allowed number of
shareholders.
16
See Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2009).
17
Furthermore, the substantial rate cuts and changes in the definition of the taxable base in 1986 could
induce changes in the Schedule C taxpayer distribution that would not be reflected in only two years of
panel data.
19
This analysis focuses on the net result of timing income since the data is ex-post and only speak to
covariates that were actually shifted: Benefit of shifting income less the cost of shifting income.
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shifting purchases of durable goods to years of relatively high marginal tax rates.20
Higher marginal rates also increase the incentive to deduct personal expenses on the
Schedule C.21 When lower future tax rates are expected, business owners have the
incentive to time and shift revenue to book in the low-tax year.

3

The Relative Price of Owner Effort
To allow for the full range of small business owners‟ potential responses to tax

changes, a theoretical model must account for owner effort and the possibility of
employing outside labor. The basic assumption is that firm owners maximize utility.
Utility is increasing in consumption, generated from the firm‟s production and decreasing
in owner effort (e):
U = U(C, e)

(1)

All income earned from the business venture is taxed at the personal income-tax rate
because the small business is a flow-through tax entity, meaning firm profits and income
flow through to the owner and are taxed at personal tax rates rather than as a separate
entity under corporate tax law.
Consumption is assumed to be the after-tax net income from the business:
C = (1-t)M ,

(2)

M = X – wL – rK

(3)

where firm net income is denoted by:

20

Higher rates can also promote “luxury office” spending that would not take place under relatively lower
tax rates. Ceteris paribus, Persian rugs, leather and mahogany furniture, and Tiffany lamp purchases are
more likely to reflect high tax periods than low.
21
With proper documentation, meals, entertainment, travel and office supply expenses are appealing
categories to increase.
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where X is the production or output of the firm. Output is a function of three possible
inputs: owner effort, hired labor, and capital. The total labor input is specified as the sum
of the owner‟s direct labor and outside labor, so that hired labor is perfectly substitutable
for the owner‟s labor. Owner effort (e) can take two forms: owner labor effort (eL) where
the owner performs tasks related to direct production (book keeping, sales, etc.) and
owner managing effort (eM) where the owner monitors the direct production of the
outside labor he employs22. The firm‟s concave production function is therefore:
X = f(em , L + eL , K)

(4)

The owner chooses eM, eL, L, and K to maximize utility (equation 1) subject to
equations (2), (3), and (4), and the nonnegativity constraints eL ≥ 0 and L ≥ 0. The
owner‟s optimization problem is therefore:

L
em, eL, L

= U(C, e) + λ0{(1-t)[f*(em , L + eL , K) – wL – rK] - C}
+ λ1(eL ) + λ2(L)

(5)

The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
= λ0

(6a)
(1-t) λ0

λ0 (1-t)

=

+ λ1)
=w if

=0

fk = r

if L = 0, ( Ĺ= L + eL)

(6b)
(6c)
(6d)
(6e)

22

For simplicity, I assume the supply curve of total owner effort is upward sloping because the vast
majority of business owners in my sample are married males with adjusted gross incomes below $250,000.
This reasonable assumption is not necessarily true and leaves the possibility of a backwards bending effort
supply curve to future work.
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Condition 1

The complementary slackness condition requires λ1

0. If λ1 > 0, it must be the case that eL = 0.

0) and requires (eL, em, L) to satisfy eL
Condition 2

0 (or λ1 = 0 if eL >

The complementary slackness condition requires λ2

0 (or λ2 = 0 if L >

0. If λ2 > 0, it must be the case that L = 0.

0) and requires (eL, em, L) to satisfy L

The Kuhn-Tucker conditions provide two sets of input demand functions: one set when L
= 0, for non-employers, and the other when L > 0, for employers. The Kuhn-Tucker
conditions (6a) and (6c) therefore imply:
=

if L = 0,

While (6d) implies:

=w

if

It is important to notice that when outside labor is employed, taxes only enter the
optimization problem through the business owner‟s effort.
The marginal cost of output is:
Min

So when L > 0, as

=

,

or, as

Or, as

.

=

.

Thus, there is a firm-specific critical value of t such that L = 0 if t < tc and L > 0 if t > tc.
Over some range it is possible that eL, L > 0. This will occur when the sum of the
marginal costs of all owner managing effort and owner labor effort is less than the wage
that would be paid to outside labor:
< w*
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(7)

The wages paid to outside labor are assumed to be determined in a perfectly competitive
labor market.
To distinguish how business owners respond to tax changes, I differentiate
Equation (7) with respect to t. Recalling that when L = 0, owners equate the marginal
products of their efforts:

, I find that:
= 0 , which is clearly positive.

(8)

Because dt is positive, there exists a value of t where it is optimal for a business owner to
switch from a regime without employed outside labor to a regime employing labor, L >
0.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions (6a) and (6b) imply:
(6c) this implies that

=

=

, together with

if L=0. It follows that the relevant comparative statics

are:
≡

=
So,

MRSe,c

(1-t) =

d(1-t)= -dt =d(

dt = d

=d

=

dt =
An increase in the marginal tax rate is a relative decrease in the price of labor because
taxes are applied to business profits and not revenues; however, the after-tax price of
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capital and all other inputs have decreased at identical rates. Hence, the relative price of
labor is unchanged as a production input but it has changed relative to the price of ownereffort.
Employers: Firms employing outside labor face the Kuhn-Tucker condition that
λ2 = 0 because L > 0. The firm owner equates his marginal product of managing effort
with the marginal product of outside labor:

When eL=0,

and

all changes in the demand for labor and capital are determined by scale effects. So,
.
I would like to find:

, because I know

(or, at least,

=

).

The business owner‟s first order condition with respect to managing effort is:
,

(9)

The total derivative of equation (9) is then:

,

(10)

Recalling that, dc = (1-t)dx , the total derivative becomes:

,

(11)

Now, dx = fede, so equation (11) becomes:

,

(12)

From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (6a) and (6b), I have the following:
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,
Neither outside labor nor capital vary directly with taxes (t).
+
,

(13)

It follows that because L and K do not vary directly with t,
dc =

(1-t)dx =

(1-t)fede ,

so by substitution equation (13) becomes:
,

(14)

And therefore,
(15)
Recall that:

,

rearranging to solve for fe yields the following:
fe =
the following expression for

, substituting into equation (15),
is obtained:

When owner labor effort is zero (eL=0) the marginal cost of effort is greater than the
market wage: Marginal Cost of Effort > w.
The corresponding second order condition is:
< 0,
To ensure utility maximization,
+ (1-t)
Solving for the critical value of μ yields the following:
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< 0,

= 0,

Simplifying,
-

, which is clearly negative.

It is possible that over some range of tax rates between the cases when no outside
labor is employed and when owners provide only managing effort that both owner labor
effort and outside labor can be positive. This occurs up to the point when the marginal
costs of managing effort equal the market wage.
Figure 1.1 displays the optimal owner effort and outside labor choices for any
given sole proprietorship. The value of the marginal product of total owner effort is
denoted by the downward sloping curve labeled MP(e). Depending on the business
owner‟s marginal product of labor, he may or may not employ outside labor in the firm.
The two full upward sloping curves represent the after-tax marginal cost of owner effort
under no taxes and then the critical tax rate. The upward sloping MC(e)/(1-t0) curve
represents owners who only exert managing effort, have zero labor effort, and employ
outside labor. The horizontal axis measures the total amount, or quantity, of owner-effort
exerted through managing effort and labor effort. The price, or shadow cost, of owner
effort is listed on the vertical axis.
Case 1: Firms with zero wage bills may employ outside labor after a tax increase
due to the relative price increase of owner-effort as a productive input. For any given
firm, there exists a critical tax rate (tc) such that t > tc implies L > 0. There is also a
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second critical tax rate (t0) such that t > t0 implies eL = 0 (for simplicity, this is can be
depicted in Figure 1.1 as MC(e)/(1-t0) but could occur anywhere to the left of the
marginal cost curve for the critical tax rate). As long as eL > 0, the firm owner simply
equates his marginal products of managing effort and labor effort [MP(em) = MP(eL)]
during maximization. But if L > 0, the owner equates the marginal product of his labor
effort with the competitive wage because his labor effort and outside labor are perfect
substitutes [MP(eL) = w]. It follows that there is a range of tax rates over which all shifts
of the after-tax marginal cost curve can cause a one-for-one substitution of managing
effort for labor effort (em for eL). Once t0 is exceeded, represented by MC(e)/(1-t0), the
owner does not exert any labor effort; he equates his marginal cost of managing with the
marginal product of managing: eL = 0 and MC(e) = MC(em) = MP(em) > w.
For firms originally not employing outside labor, Figure 1.1 shows that
production decreases, but the firm owner may substitute outside labor for his labor-effort.
When tax rates increase, owner-effort decreases for the firm but the firm‟s demand for
outside labor increases as it moves to a positive wage bill from a previous wage bill of
zero. When the critical tax rate is reached or exceeded, owners begin employing outside
labor to undertake some of the tasks previously done by the owner. With higher and
higher tax rates exceeding the critical rate, owners continue to reduce their labor effort,
employ additional outside labor at the tax-deductable wage, and spend more time
managing. This pattern continues until the next critical tax rate t0 is reached at which
owners exert only managing effort.
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Case 2: Firms with positive wage bills prior to tax increases are denoted by the
upward sloping MC(e)/(1-t0) curve. The firm owners only exert managing effort and upon
tax increases, the marginal cost of managing effort increases and owners spend less time
managing. Henceforth, all changes in employment and output are due to the scale effect
of reduced managerial effort by the owner. After the tax increase, the business owner
reduces his demand for outside labor, ceteris paribus.

4

Two-Period Intertemporal Production and Tax Avoidance
A static single time-period is convenient to model but unrealistic when

individuals and firms seek to maximize utility and profits over many time periods. When
this is the case, the decision-maker must account for current tax rates as well as future tax
rates. For business owners producing different goods and services, the storability of their
product will directly affect their ability to take advantage of relatively low tax rates in
some years.23
With two periods and non-storable products, firms employing labor strive to
produce and sell in the period of relatively low tax rates. Output and the firm‟s demand
for outside labor increase in periods of relatively low tax rates. Referring back to Figure
1.1, firms without employed labor which produce non-storable products utilize only
owner managing and labor effort. For firms without employees, periods of relatively high
tax rates induce a higher probability of employing labor as owners substitute away from

23

I assume tax-payers have rational expectations or perfect foresight; henceforth, future taxes are known
with certainty and any deviations are random noise.
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owner labor effort. Periods of relatively low tax rates imply the firms are less likely to
employ because owner labor effort is less costly than wages to potential employees.
Firms producing storable products have a more complicated maximization
problem. Augmenting the production function in Section 3 to allow for two time periods,
I see that firm owners maximize utility subject to the two-period budget constraint.
Utility is an increasing function of consumption and decreasing in effort in both periods.
U(c0, c1, e0, e1)

(16)

Consumption in both periods is simply after-tax income where after-tax income in the
future period includes the production that was stored from the initial period:
C0 =(1-t0)M0

(17)

C1 =(1-t1)M1 , which can also be stated:
C1 =(1-t1)[ f(e1 , L1 , K1) – wL1 – rK1 + S0].

(18)

Where income in the initial period is simply production less the amount of production
(S0) that is carried forward to sell in the next period:
M0 = f(e0 , L0 , K0) – wL0 – rK0 – S0]

(19)

For the case when future tax rates are expected to decline (t1 <t0), the owner
chooses eM, eL, L, K, c0, c1, and S0 to maximize utility (equation 16) subject to equations
17 through 19 and the production function, and the nonnegativity constraints L0, L1 ≥ 0.
With storable production, the owner‟s optimization problem becomes:

L
eM, eL, L, K, c0, c1, S0

= U(c0, c1, e0, e1) +
λ0{(1-t0)(1+r)[f*(e0 , L0 , K0) – wL0 – rK0 – S0]

+ (1-t1)[f*(e1 , L1 , K1) – wL1 – rK1 + S0]– C0 –C1} + λ1L0 + λ2 L1
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(20)

Taxes enter the optimization problem only through effort and storage of the good. The
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:

(1-t0)(1+r) λ0

=
(1-t1) λ0

+ λ1),

= λ0(1+r)

(21a)

= λ1

(21b)

(1-t0)(1+r) λ0

(21c)

(1-t1)λ0

(21d)

if L = 0, Recall: Ĺ = L+eL

=

+ λ2),

=w if

=0

(21g)

=w if

=0

(21h)

if L = 0, (Ĺ = L+eL)

(21i)

=r

(21j)
(21k)

The complementary slackness condition requires λ2

0) and requires (eL, em, L) to satisfy L

(21f)

=r

-(1-t0)(1+r) λ0 +(1-t1) λ0 which implies:
Condition 1

(21e)

0 (or λ2 = 0 if L >

0. If λ2 > 0, it must be the case that L = 0.

The Kuhn-Tucker conditions (21a-21d) imply:
,
which can be rearranged to solve for the marginal rate of substitution of effort and
consumption.
.
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(22)

Firms not employing outside labor equate the marginal product of owner
managing effort to the marginal product of owner labor effort which will always be less
than the competitive market wage (If L=0,
differentiate

). I simply

(equation 22) with respect to current period taxes (t0) and future taxes

(t1) to identify how the relative marginal products change in the two periods when one tax
rates increases.

<0.
>0.

(23)
(24)

Equation 23 shows that for increases in current tax rates, or relative decreases in
future tax rates, firms produce in the current period but store the product and sell
relatively more in the future when tax rates are relatively low. The marginal product of
current effort has declined, or the marginal product of future owner effort has risen.
Equation 24 portrays a similar picture for future tax increases. When future tax
rates rise, firms want to produce and sell more today because the marginal product of
future effort declines relative to current owner effort. The current and future tax rate
comparative statics are identical for both firms with and without outside labor because
the effect on owner effort is due to the storability of the product.
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5

The Data
Using pooled cross-sectional data, a stratified random sample of all taxpayers in

each year is created. Schedule C taxpayers are assumed to respond identically in each
year to tax changes, ceteris paribus. Reported wage bill is used as a proxy for
employment because actual employment levels, or the number of employees, are not
observed. If firms are less likely to employ labor following tax increases, they should be
more likely to employ labor, ceteris paribus, under tax rate decreases.24
The data reported on a Schedule C include the aggregate revenues, expenses and
net income from the business endeavors of sole proprietors.25 Schedule C filers can, and
legally should, include “odd-job” income from people without formal business names or
practices.26 In 2007, 23.1 million returns included a Schedule C filing. 27 Schedule C
entities represent about 70% of all IRS documented businesses over 1988-2007.28
Historically, around 70% of Schedule C filers have no wage bills; in 2007,
salaries and wages accounted for 12.8% of all expenses. The largest expense by
aggregate small business filers is “Other Business Deductions”, representing almost 25%

24

Note: I am never assuming firms behave symmetrically to tax increases and decreases.
Schedule C does not include data for S-Corporations and some LLCs. Single member Limited Liability
Corporations (LLCs) can elect to file a Schedule C. In 2005, of the Schedule C filers, roughly 450,000 were
registered LLCs. Multi-member LLCs are type of partnership and file a Schedule E under Partnership
Income.
26
For example, an economics professor files a Schedule C to report consulting income but is not
technically filed with the Secretary of State as a business. This also includes goods sold on eBay; however,
it typically behooves the seller to not file the Schedule C and avoid reporting the income, particularly when
the transactions are difficult to track.
27
If a taxpayer owns several businesses, a Schedule C is filed separately for each business.
28
C-corporations are included in the aggregate IRS business filings. The number of C-corporations drops
from about 12% in 1988 to 5.8% of all filers in 2007. The number of S-corporations rises from 6.6% to
12.5% for 1988 and 2007, respectively.
25
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of total expenses.29 This category includes resource depletion, employee benefit
programs, legal and professional services30, pension and profit-sharing plans, meals and
entertainment, and home-office business deductions. If tax evasion increases at an
increasing rate with higher taxes, the incentive to overstate expenses or understate
revenues will bias employment and wage bill observations and coefficient estimates
towards zero.
My analysis will focus on Schedule C data and taxpayer characteristics. 31 Data
come from the NBER Public Use File on Individual Income-tax Returns from 1992-2005.
Each year of data provides a 10% stratified random sample of unaudited and unamended
tax returns. High-income households are oversampled and there are no missing values in
the dataset32. All upper-income returns that are sampled at greater than 10% are subsampled at 10% to further protect taxpayer identity. 33 Cross-sectional data capture
population changes over time and avoid survival biases associated with a balanced panel.
Using returns only as far back as 1992 is important for several reasons: taxable
income is defined differently before 1987 (Old Concept) and after 1987 (New Concept),
29

Source: http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/09sumbulsolprop.pdf
Legal and professional services include private contractors.
31
Schedule C data have limited personal characteristic variables; however, the data are rich in income and
expense variables.
32
For each year, all of the extreme value AGI filers are not included in the sample because there would be a
10% chance of selection for each filer. Because of the extreme value omissions 45 filers for 2005 are not
sampled.
33
For all filers with AGI greater than $200,000 several codes are completely removed: State Codes,
Alimony Paid/Received, and State Sales Tax Deduction. This applies to roughly 25% of firms employing
labor and 6% of firms without labor. Marital Status and number of dependents are also modified. For high
AGI filers, returns are further modified: the Schedule C fields for salaries and wages, state income-taxes,
and real estate taxes are blurred by multivariate blurring when two of the three categories have nonzero
numbers. Multivariate blurring is applied to each of the three categories after sub-grouping, the observation
is averaged with the two observations closest to it and then the field is replaced with the average value. It is
important to remember than one observation never contains the full content of the return and often includes
data from more than one return.
30
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“salaries paid to employees” is not included in the dataset until 1987, and the effects of
the 1986 reforms could linger for several years. Post-1986 data avoids changes in the
definition of the taxable-base, thereby allowing a consistent definition of taxable income
and cleaner variation presented by the 1993 and 2003 tax reforms.34
Taxpayers filing only Schedule E are also excluded because the dataset does not
provide any information on salaries or employment for such entities. 35 Taxpayers
receiving social security income are dropped from the dataset because potential retirees
may operate businesses differently than do non-retirees.36 Observations with positive
AMT37 liabilities are excluded because they face different marginal and statutory tax
rates than peer filers. 38 Unlike prior literature, all business entities are included, not
merely those that are profitable. 39 These observations contain valuable information if
business losses are one form of sheltering taxable income. 40 Henceforth, for this analysis,
loss entities are considered an equilibrium condition, though the results are not affected
when the observations are omitted.

34

Furthermore, the data begin in 1992 in order to mitigate any changes in behavior still occurring from the
1986 rate changes and base changes. Results are not sensitive to including the additional years of 1990 and
1991.
35
Schedule E includes business income from partnerships and s-corporations.
36
Approximately 50,000 observations are omitted. This is consistent with the literature, if the business is a
hobby, the retiree may be less responsive to incentives, or if the owner is preparing to sell or leave the
business, behavior may be atypical.
37
AMT stands for “Alternative Minimum Tax”: approximately 2000 observations in each year, or 6% of
remaining observations are deleted because of the AMT.
38
Taxpayers with AMT liabilities do not pay the statutory rates listed in the IRS tax tables.
39
Loss-entities could serve as a tax-sheltering vehicle but presently past researchers and myself have no
way of distinguishing between legitimate businesses and tax-shelters in the dataset.
40
A Schedule C is filed for each business. A taxpayer may file one or several Schedule C‟s. Taxes are paid
on the net position of all the businesses because the losses of one business offset the taxable income of
profitable businesses.
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5a

Data: Summary Statistics
Selected summary statistics for the data are presented in Table 1.1a and 1.1b. The

average marginal tax rate over all 402,651 Schedule C filers in the sample is 21.6% but is
22.65% for filers employing labor.42 On average, statutory tax rates decrease slightly over
the time period: the average future tax rate for all firms is 20.65%. Small-business owners
have an unconditional average annual wage bill of $70,397 that varies significantly over
filers, with a standard deviation of $380,083. Sample wage bills range from $0 to $49.8
million, with a 26.57% probability of having a positive wage bill. For employers, the
mean wage bill is significantly higher at $264,914 with a standard deviation of $701,504.
Such a large variance suggests that truncation is likely and that a truncated model could
outperform a standard model for the data.
Not surprisingly, Schedule C filers report much higher adjusted gross incomes
than the average population. With mean AGI of $746,074 and a standard deviation of
$4.1 million the data provide much variation over income: ranging from -$337 million to
$534 million. These businesses receive up to $2.36 billion in Schedule C Receipts with a
mean of $730,894 and standard deviation of $10.1 million. Taxable business income
ranges from -$140 million to $50.9 million with a mean of $91,812 and a standard
deviation of $625,028.43

42

All dollar figures are adjusted for inflation and stated in 2005 real dollars.
Losses can occur for a number of reasons including: start-up costs, large capital expenditures or
depreciation. Start-up costs were limited to $5,000 in excess of revenues for 2009; anything in excess of
that is amortized over the next 15-years.
43
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The raw correlations of the wage bill and the current tax rate and the future tax
rate are 0.145 and 0.147, respectively. The current marginal tax rate and the future
marginal tax rate are highly correlated with a raw correlation of 0.94.

6a

Empirical Analysis Allowing for Intertemporal Substitution of Owner Effort
My interest lies in the probability of a firm employing labor and the firm‟s level

of employment. The Heckman 2-step model uses information on both businesses
employing labor (employers) and businesses not employing labor (non-employers) to
estimate the conditional wage bill elasticity. It allows for the presence of a limited
dependent variable (employing labor) and correlated processes for choosing to employ
and then the level of employment, conditional on having chosen to employ.
My goal is to identify the two distinct effects of changes in current tax rates and
future tax rates on both the probability of employing labor and total employment. The
theoretical framework presented in Section 3 shows that both the probability of
employing labor and the wage bill depend on the specifics of the production function
with respect to owner labor-effort, managing-effort and employment of outside labor, as
well as the optimal scale of the firm.
The decision to employ labor is made once some threshold is passed. This
threshold will depend on the managerial skill of the business owner; the costs associated
with employing any labor: the administrative burdens of payroll, employee taxes, current
and future tax rates, and access to lines of credit to maintain payroll. When the threshold
is reached, the firm employs labor and must then decide how much labor to employ. If
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firms take equilibrium wages as given, the amount of labor employed varies directly with
the wage bill variable.
The amount of labor employed depends on many of the same variables included
in the employment decision; however, variables that affect only the fixed costs of
employing labor are not included. The two decisions are very closely related, so a flexible
framework is needed to allow for any correlation between the two decisions. The
Heckman selection model allows for precisely such flexibility.
The first step is to estimate the change in the probability of employing labor,
which is explained by the following probit model:
= β0τi,t + β1τi,t+1 + X’β + εi , where

(1)

The parameter, β0, measures the contemporaneous effect of current tax rate changes while
β1 estimates the anticipatory effect of tax rate changes in the next year. The future tax
rate parameter, β1, reflects the ability to shift income (Revenue-Expenses) across
consecutive tax periods. Empirically, the future tax rate may or may not be certain but I
assume tax-payers have rational expectations; henceforth, future taxes are known with
certainty and any deviations are random noise. The data report actual tax rates as proxies
for expectations. Tax reforms can induce both contemporaneous and anticipatory effects.
All tax rates are statutory rates which serve as exogenous proxies for marginal tax rates.44
The X-vector includes variables thought to influence the firm‟s decision to
employ outside labor. The vector β is the conformable parameter vector for the
covariates. Capital income (the sum of interest and dividends) and personal property
44

For more discussion on the effective marginal and statutory rates refer to Section 2.
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taxes are used to proxy for a taxpayer‟s assets which may affect a business owner‟s labor
supply, ability to re-invest in the firm and obtain outside financing.45 Capital income and
personal property taxes are included to reflect the capital constraints facing the business.
Firms with larger capital stocks will find it easier to obtain loans and lines of credit to
fund payrolls.
Depreciation is observed for each Schedule C and serves as an industry proxy
because some industries with large depreciation expenses (manufacturing) are less laborintensive than businesses with small depreciation expenses (consulting or law), which
could affect the firm‟s labor-demand.46 The number of dependents (exemptions) and
marital-status proxy for the business owner‟s preferences for consumption, labor and
leisure. Two indicator variables for the presence of other businesses (partnerships and Scorps filed on a Schedule E, and farms filed on a Schedule F) and the amount of Schedule
E income are also included in the selection equation47.

45

My proxy for capital income, is a very poor measure of tax-payer wealth but as in previous research, is
included as a proxy for the ease of funding: for example, a business owner with large amounts of capital
income will receive more offers and lower interest rates from potential lenders than a business owner with
limited assets to pledge as collateral. Interest and dividend income is used because such sources are
considered more stable than capital gains. Capital gains fluctuate much more than other measures of access
to capital and are also very sensitive to capital gains (losses) tax rates and laws. See Feldstein (1997) for a
detailed analysis.
46
Depreciation expenses could be a lagged or jointly-determined variable given both capital and labor are
required for production. However, most small firms do not depreciate any assets. For firms with
depreciation expenses, any changes in response to current and future tax rates will be very small relative to
a firm‟s total depreciation expense or capital expenditures because depreciated property is typically written
off over 5-39 years and not taken until the asset is “ready and available for use”. Automobiles are typically
depreciated over five years while nonresidential property is depreciated over 39 years. I follow past
research and include depreciation because I think the benefits outweigh the costs. See
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p946/ch01.html#en_US_2010_publink1000107327 for a full discussion.
47
Schedule E firms are typically owned by one to three people. The S-corporation classification allows up
to 100 shareholders; however, S-corporations with more than ten shareholders constitute only 0.06% of all
S-corporations.
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The indicators for other businesses reflect the threshold effect of employing
labor.48 Employing labor includes fixed costs that must be borne by the owner:
familiarizing oneself with a payroll system, and learning and maintaining labor-specific
regulations and administrative up-keep. Once an owner has undertaken such costs once, it
is virtually costless to apply the knowledge to other enterprises. 49 The variable for the
level of Schedule E income allows for the success (or loss) of one business to potentially
flow through to the other firm operated by the same taxpayer. 50
The independent variables are used to estimate the inverse Mills ratio which is
then used as a variable in the second stage. Consistent with previous literature, state-level
fixed effects are not used because 25% of all firms employing labor do not possess a state
indicator variable due to blurred data on high-income taxpayers. Omitting the blurred
high-income observations to model the State-level fixed-effects substantially skews the
results.
The second stage regression includes only the variables in X that directly affect
the magnitude or level of employment and not the decision to employ. The second stage
regression also includes the inverse Mills ratio from the first stage to account for any
selection on unobservables by employers:
yi = β0τi,t + β1τi,t+1 + β2X + εi
48

(2)

It would be nice to include an indicator only if labor is actually employed in the other business; however,
my data do not provide wage bills for the Schedule E or the Schedule F.
49
For example, if a taxpayer runs a seasonal farm and files a Schedule F as well as a Schedule C for
another business, that taxpayer has already forgone the fixed costs associated with employing labor because
farms are relatively labor-intensive. This lowers the initial fixed cost of employing labor in the Schedule C
business.
50
This relationship need not be positive, though it could be: a firm owner with one successful enterprise
may be more or less likely to have success in a second endeavor.
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The vector Xi includes the same variables included in the probit model but excludes the
indicator variables for other businesses, because the variables only affect the decision to
employ and not the level of employment. The Schedule E and F indicator variables are
the only variables omitted from the second stage regression; this also ensures full
identification in the Heckman model.
The current tax rate, future tax rate, capital income, personal property taxes,
depreciation expenses, number of dependents, marital status, and the level of Schedule E
income constitute Xi. As in the probit model, the coefficients on the two tax variables are
separately identified to estimate the impact of contemporary and anticipatory firm
responses. The coefficient on the current tax rate reflects contemporaneous behavior
responding to current period changes. The effect of a change in the future tax rate is
important because it affects business owners‟ labor-leisure decisions in the current year
and reflects their ability to shift income (output) across two periods. This implies the
short-run response is larger than the long-run response. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the
future rate signals that employed labor will be relatively less valuable as a production
input in the future than in the present. Decreases in the future tax rate signal that
employed labor is relatively less valuable in the current year than in the future year. The
parameter β1 reflects the incentive of business owners to adjust the timing of their own
labor, revenues and expenses across time periods to take advantage of relatively low tax
rates, or to avoid relatively high tax rates.
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6b

Estimation
For the full sample of observations in 1992-2005, the Heckman model estimates

are reported in Table 1.2. Column 1 displays the marginal effects from the probit
model. 53 Estimates over the entire time period (1992-2005) provide a local average
treatment effect for small business employment and wage bill decisions responding to
marginal tax rate changes.54 Employment and wage bill estimates will be biased towards
zero when higher tax rates induce tax evasion and miss-reporting because owners have
the incentive to reduce employment but overstate the wage bill. 55
The marginal effects of interest show that a one percentage point increase in
current tax rates increases the probability of employing outside labor by 1.18%. This
represents the contemporaneous response of business owners to current period tax
changes. A one percentage point increase in the marginal tax rate next year decreases the
probability of employing labor today by 0.70%. 56 The opposite signs on the two tax
coefficients relay very different behavioral responses. In the short-run, reflected by
current tax rate changes, owners decrease their own labor effort and switch to monitoring
outside labor. Conversely, future tax rate changes induce slowed production in the firm
and a decrease in the firm‟s demand for all factors of production: employed labor, capital
and owner effort.

53

The observations are distributed evenly through the years with roughly 19,500 observations per year .
See Figure (5) for exact tax rate changes.
55
The wage bill, or wage bills, is a tax-deductable business expense.
56
At first glance the large negative correlation coefficient in the Heckman analysis may seem unusual;
however, it simply states that for firms with low probabilities of employing labor, holding the observable
variables constant, if the unobservable characteristics increase the firm‟s probability of employing labor
then the firm is likely to have a low wage bill if they actually do employ labor. A similar story can be told
for firms with high probabilities of employing labor while holding observed characteristics constant.
54
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The second stage regression in Column 3 shows that a one percentage point
increase in the current tax rate reduces the mean wage bill by $7,678; whereas a one
percentage point increase in the future tax rate increases the mean wage bill by $8,707.
Given firms take market wages as exogenous, the results from the first and second stages
imply that current-period tax increases reduce average wage bills because of lower
production and because more owners are going to employ outside labor when the price of
outside labor drops relative to the price of owner labor.
Consistent with the two-period model in Section 4, increases in future tax rates
make production today more attractive relative to production tomorrow; hence, firms
employ more people to boost current period production and shift away from the next
period‟s relatively high taxes. Relatively high marginal tax rates in future periods imply
owners‟ labor effort is relatively less valuable tomorrow than it is today: more leisure is
consumed in high tax periods and the owner‟s managerial effort and employed labor are
complements.57
The mean and median wage bill elasticities with respect to current tax rate
changes are -0.17 and -0.64, respectively. The future tax rate elasticity is 0.18 for the
mean and 0.65 for the median. These estimates differ from those by Carroll et al. (2000a),
0.37 for current tax changes, and LaLumia (2008) found insignificant estimates.
Operating another business (limited liability) or farm, which suggests that the
fixed costs of employing labor have already been borne by the owner, increases the

57

The time horizon of observations is important to capture the behavioral effects. For this analysis,
including two periods is all that is feasible.
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probability of employing labor in the sole proprietorship by 7.86% and 12.57%,
respectively. A $100,000 increase in depreciation expenses increases the probability of
employing labor by 25.7%. In the second stage (Column 3), a $1 increase in capital
income, depreciation and business income earned outside the sole proprietorship,
increases wage bills by $0.22, $0.34 and $0.03, respectively.
None of the estimates reported in Table 1.2 differ appreciably between the linear
and logarithmic specifications. The natural-log specification yields virtually identical
estimates and thus, are not reported. Furthermore, the density for the logarithm of wage
bills is approximately normal, justifying the Heckman assumption of normality. Figure
1.2 shows the kernel density for wage bills for all observations with firms employing
labor. The median wage bill of $264,914 for firms employing labor implies 50% of the
distribution occurs well below the sample mean of $89,790.
6c

Behavioral Differences by Firm Size
Segmenting the data by gross business receipts lends insight to how differently

sized firms respond to tax changes. There are noticeable differences in the data around
$250,000 and $3.5 million in gross receipts. As shown in Tables 1.3a and 1.3b, small,
medium and large firms respond differently to tax changes.
The probit analysis in the upper half of Table 1.5 shows medium to large firms are
more likely to contemporaneously respond to current tax increases by employing outside
labor and reducing owner labor effort. Medium and large firms are also more likely to
reduce production when future tax rates increase. Firms with gross receipts in excess of
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$3.5 million are 6.66% less likely to employ labor in the current period if the tax rate is
known to increase one percentage point next period.
As expected, the coefficient signs are positive on the farm indicator for all firm
sizes but the changing sign on the indicator for other businesses (limited liability firms
and S-corporations) is worth noting. Firms with gross receipts of $250,000 or less are
9.63% more likely to employ labor when another business is present. Medium and large
firms are respectively 15.66% and 7.37% less likely to employ when another business
entity exists. The main difference among the firms is the type of business filing the
Schedule C in a given gross receipt range. My data do not include industry classification,
but in the aggregate report produced by the IRS high gross-receipt firms are more likely
to include consultants, financial services (insurance, securities brokers, investment
banking), and professional sciences than smaller firms which are largely comprised of
construction, real estate and leasing, and wholesale and retail trade. 58
The second stage estimates suggest that medium and large firms are more likely
than small firms to shift production to periods of relatively low tax rates, as evidenced by
the large positive wage bill coefficients on future tax rates.
Table 1.3b summarizes elasticity estimates for firms with differently sized gross
receipts. The results support Figure 1.1 previously depicted in Section 3 with regard to
current tax changes. Small firms are not as likely as large firms to employ outside labor;
small firms are likely to rely solely on the owner‟s labor-effort prior to tax increases.
Current-period tax increases decrease the relative price of outside labor versus owner-
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See http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/0,,id=134481,00.html for industry data in each year.
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effort for small and marginal firms, which do indeed employ more outside labor. Large
firms, which are more likely to employ labor initially, cut production and demand for all
inputs when current period taxes increase.
Medium and large firms respond similarly to future tax changes, but large firms
react more to current tax changes. Large firms have a median wage bill elasticity of -0.20,
whereas small firms have a wage bill elasticity of -5.41 with respect to future tax rates,
suggesting their production is very sensitive to market expectations and growth
incentives.

7

Elasticity Estimates for the Specific Reforms of 1993 and 2001-2003
The nature of the OBRA-93 and EGTRRA are very different with OBRA-93 only

increasing marginal tax rates on high income-taxpayers and EGTRRA reducing tax rates
on all income brackets. EGTRRA was phased in gradually over three years, whereas
OBRA-93 occurred in a single tax year. These structural differences could affect taxpayer
behavior and elasticity estimates. Elasticity estimates are presented in Table 1.4 for the
individual tax reforms, OBRA-93 and EGTRRA and JGTRRA in 2001-2003. Roughly
30% of firms employed outside labor during 1992-1994 as seen in Column 1. Only 25%
of observations employed labor in the 2001-2005 sample. The mean and median wage
bill elasticities for the 1993 current tax increases are -0.47 and -0.60, respectively. The
wage bill elasticity with respect to future tax rates is 0.12 at the mean. The 2001-2005
elasticity estimates reflect more modest responses at -0.27 and -0.31 for the mean and
median, respectively. The mean future tax rate elasticity is 0.10 for the 143,054
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observations in 2001-2005. The relatively modest estimates for EGTRRA may reflect the
gradual nature of the tax reform.
I notice a general decline in the probability of employing labor over time in the
sample. This could be due to the rise in popularity of the S-corporation and the decline of
Schedule C filers. The decline in employment could be a symptom of the changing
business environment with more one-man shops opening due to the rise of the Internet.
The kernel densities in Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4 suggest the former explanation is more
likely to be supported by the data. The wage bill kernel density estimates for the two time
periods look very similar with the exception of firms with wage bills in excess of $5
million. Each year contains approximately the same number of observations but firms
with large wage bills appear to be dropping out of the sample between 1994 and 2001.
Firms with larger wage bills may be opting for S-corporation status and filing Schedule E
instead of Schedule C. As shown in Figures 1.3 and 1.4, employers in 1992-1994 were
more evenly distributed over the $5 million to $30 million range. In 2001-2005, the
majority of employers fall in the $5 million to $10 million range.
Tax-return data only provide wage bills for Schedule C filers; hence, the estimates
reflect only sole-proprietorships and single-owner LLCs. To the extent these businesses
are similar to S-corporations and partnerships, the results provide an accurate estimate of
the employment effects of small businesses. S-corporations tend to be larger than other
small business entities whereas most service businesses (doctors, lawyers, dentists) file as
partnerships and limited liability corporations. Because of the preferential treatment
given to S-corporations under the 1986 tax reforms, the entity has continued to rise in
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popularity. Future research may want to investigate the behavioral and labor decisions of
S-corporations with respect to tax rate changes.

8

Omitted Variable Bias: Implications of Excluding Future Tax Rates
Table 1.5 compares a Heckman model with both current and future tax rates to a

Heckman model with only current tax rates in Columns 1 and 2, respectively. Including
only current tax rates biases the marginal effect on employing labor upwards in the first
stage, as shown in Column 2 where a one percentage point change in current tax rates
implies firms are 5.02% more likely to employ outside labor.
Excluding the future tax variable results in a positive coefficient in the second
stage for wage bills instead of the negative coefficient reported in Column 1. Marginal
effects and coefficients for the other independent variables change little when future tax
rates are excluded. Column 3 reports the least-squares regression using both future and
current tax rates. Column 4 omits the future-tax-rate regressor but is otherwise identical
to Column 3. Column 4 is most similar to the methodology employed by Carroll et al.
(2000a) and LaLumia (2008). The first stage is a probit model independent of the second
stage, which is a least-squares regression on only observations with positive wage bills.
The bias occurs from estimating the entire behavioral effect as contemporaneous
instead of decomposing the response to also account for the anticipatory effect. Omitting
future tax rates as an explanatory variable induces an omitted variable bias that skews the
interpretation of the current and future tax rate coefficients and marginal effects but
leaves the other coefficients unchanged.
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Recall that my Heckman estimates reported in Table 1.2 report a median wage bill
elasticity with respect to current tax rates of 0.65. For comparison, Carroll et al. (2000a)
estimated a median wage bill elasticity of 0.37. Carroll et al. (2000a) estimated that a
marginal tax increase of 1% decreases the mean probability of hiring workers by 1.2%
for a balanced panel in 1986 and 1988. LaLumia (2008) used five-years of panel-data
beginning in 1999 and did not find any results of statistical significance for the
probability of hiring labor or changes in wage bills. LaLumia (2008) explains that
observation weighting and the nature of the two tax reforms accounts for the difference
between her estimates and those by Carroll et al. (2000a). The 2001 reforms reduced the
tax rates in every bracket but the 1986 reforms focused only on the top income bracket
and also broadened the taxable base. Similar to my data, Carroll et al. (2000a) use data
with oversampled high-AGI taxpayers whereas LaLumia (2008) uses unweighted data.

9

Specification Testing: The Bias of OLS on Positive Wage Bill Observations
The Heckman specification allows for the possibility of unobserved differences

between employers and non-employers. Some owners are more likely to employ workers
because of the nature of their business. For example, a cleaning business is more likely to
have staff employees than an economic consultant or a tax accountant. Furthermore,
business owners with better managerial skills are more likely to employ outside labor and
are likely to employ more workers than a poor manager. The Heckman allows for such
possibilities and estimates the relationship. The assumption of independence used by
Carroll et al (2000a) and LaLumia (2008) implicitly assumes all business owners are
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equally efficient managers. Independence also assumes all firms, regardless of industry
affiliation and size, are equally likely to employ. My theoretical model and empirical
results find the assumption of independence unrealistic.
Table 1.6 summarizes results from the truncated and standard OLS regression and
contrasts the estimates with the tobit and Heckman specifications. Column 1 restates the
second stage estimates from the Heckman results reported in Table 1.2.
The tobit model in Column 2 assumes both the participation and spending
equations are drawn from the same distribution with identical covariates. Tobit estimates
are presented as a specification test. Similar to the Heckman specification, the tobit
allows for correlation between the two equations but imposes strict assumptions about the
type of relationship.
The tobit is nested in the Heckman as the special case when the correlation
coefficient, rho, equals 1. This assumes the selection and expense decisions are perfectly
correlated. The tobit estimates for current and future marginal tax rates are $6,810 and $2,391, respectively, which differ dramatically from the Heckman estimates of -$7,678
and $8,707. The tobit estimates often have different signs than the Heckman estimates;
this is indicative of the positive relationship assumed in the tobit model instead of the
estimated correlation of -0.95.
A likelihood ratio test examining the Heckman and tobit model fails to reject the
null hypothesis that the Heckman is the true model at 0.01%; therefore, the Heckman
model is preferred to the more restrictive tobit.
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Columns 3 and 4 show the different covariate estimates for a least-squares
regression on positive wage bill observations and a standard least-squares regression on
all observations. As mentioned earlier, truncated data with a large variance are typically
analyzed efficiently using a truncated model instead of standard OLS. As expected,
standard OLS is outperformed by least-squares estimation on only positive observations.
Standard OLS in Column 3 weights employers and non-employers equally and
shows the mean result of a tax change on the entire sample. Past research estimates a
probit model for the probability of employing labor that would be identical to the first
stage estimates in the Heckman model. For the wage bill response, past research simply
performs OLS on positive wage-bill observations, this method is displayed in Column 4.
The Column 4 estimates are calculated under the false assumption of no correlation
between the selection and wage bill equations. Least-squares estimation on positive
observations assumes that the two decisions are independent, whereas the Heckman
model allows for independence while accommodating potential correlation. The leastsquares method biases the estimates towards finding no result. Failing to account for
employer selection on unobservables produces very different estimates with much lower
magnitudes and sometimes opposite signs.

10

Conclusion
Changes

in tax rates have

intertemporal effects.

Focusing

only on

contemporaneous adjustments underestimates the true behavioral responses of business
owners to tax changes. My analysis has decomposed the total effect of changing tax rates
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into two important parts: current responses and preparations for the future. The future-tax
coefficient provides an estimate for the ability to shift income and entrepreneurial effort
across consecutive tax periods. Modeling separate tax rates helps to separate the
contemporaneous responses to current tax changes from the anticipatory reactions to
future tax changes.
Using pooled cross-sectional tax return data from 1992-2005, I estimate the small
business probability of employing labor and employment level for Schedule C filers with
respect to statutory tax-rate changes. Economic theory predicts that small businesses
using productive inputs of owner-effort, labor and capital may be more or less likely to
employ labor after tax increases due to the relative price increase of owner-effort and the
substitutability of owner-labor and tax-deductable outside labor.
My findings support the theoretical model that employing labor involves variable
wage and monitoring costs, in addition to the fixed costs of payroll systems and
administration. From the probit estimates of the Heckman 2-step analysis, a one
percentage point increase in current tax rates increases the probability of employing
outside labor by 1.18 percent. This represents the contemporaneous response of business
owners to current period tax changes. A one percentage point increase in the marginal tax
rate next year decreases the probability of employing labor today by 0.70 percent.
In the short-run (reflected by current tax rate changes), owners decrease their own
labor effort and switch to monitoring outside labor. Conversely, future tax rate changes
induce slowed production in the firm and a decrease in the firm‟s demand for all factors
of production. The mean and median wage bill elasticities with respect to current tax
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rates are -0.17 and -0.64, respectively. The comparable elasticities with respect to future
tax rates are 0.18 for the mean and 0.65 for the median. These estimates are almost
double the largest estimates reported in the previous literature.
Given that wages paid in the labor market are competitive, the results from the
first and second stages together show that current-period tax increases reduce average
wage bills because of lower production, while some owners substitute toward hired labor
when its price drops relative to the price of the owner‟s own labor. Increases in future tax
rates make production today more attractive relative to production tomorrow, indicating
that firms anticipating higher future taxes shift production intertemporally.
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Table 1.1a
Summary Statistics for Schedule C Taxpayers 1992-2005
Summary Statistics include the median, mean, minimum and maximum for observations employing labor, and those not employing labor, for all years
included in the dataset.

Variable

Median

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

Marginal Tax Rate (τ)

27.00%

21.60%

14.43%

0%

39.60%

Future Marginal Tax Rate (τ+1)

25.00%

20.65%

15.21%

0%

39.60%

Probability of Employing Labor

0%

26.57%

44.17%

0%

100%

Wage Bill

$0

$70,397

$380,083

$0

$49,800,000

Adjusted Gross Income (AGI)

$90,443

$746,074

$4,134,146

-$337,000,000

$534,000,000

Gross Receipts (Schedule-C)

$49,180

$730,894

$10,100,000

-$3,079,748

$2,360,000,000

$133

$17,527

$121,255

$0

$19,000,000

Capital Income

$1,001

$65,230

$541,515

$0

$79,600,000

Taxable Business Income (Schedule-C)

$9,005

$91,812

$625,028

-$140,000,000

$50,900,000

Observations

402,651

Depreciation

Note: Gross receipts are negative due to firms electing to use accrual accounting methods.
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Table 1.1b
Summary Statistics for Schedule C Taxpayers Conditional on Employing, or not
Employing, Labor 1992-2005
Summary Statistics for employers are substantially larger than for non-employers, particularly for median and mean AGI, gross receipts, depreciation and
taxable Schedule C business income. Schedule C businesses with large gross receipts but not employing labor include firms in consulting, finance and
insurance, and professional, scientific and technical services.

Variable

Median

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

28.00%

22.65%

14.14%

0.00%

39.60%

Conditional on Employing Labor
Marginal Tax Rate (τ)
Future Marginal Tax Rate (τ+1)

27.50%

21.47%

15.07%

0.00%

39.60%

Wage Bill

$89,790

$264,914

$701,504

$1

$49,800,000

Adjusted Gross Income (AGI)

$118,068

$437,067

$3,854,542

-$337,000,000

$440,000,000

Gross Receipts (Schedule-C)

$621,010

$1,628,747

$6,653,973

-$2,714,034

$1,120,000,000

Depreciation

$10,835

$45,042

$179,785

$0

$14,600,000

Capital Income

$1,343

$47,506

$531,592

$0

$79,600,000

Taxable Business Income (Schedule-C)

$63,312

$191,003

$758,471

-$63,600,000

$43,200,000

Observations

106,999

Conditional on not Employing Labor
Marginal Tax Rate (τ)

25.00%

21.22%

14.51%

0.00%

39.60%

Future Marginal Tax Rate (τ+1)

15.00%

20.36%

15.25%

0.00%

39.60%

-

-

-

-

-

Adjusted Gross Income (AGI)

$79,472

$857,907

$4,225,226

-$246,000,000

$534,000,000

Gross Receipts (Schedule-C)

$20,565

$405,956

$11,100,000

-$3,079,748

$2,360,000,000

Wage Bill

Depreciation

$0

$7,569

$89,179

$0

$19,000,000

$855

$71,645

$544,921

$0

$75,300,000

Taxable Business Income (Schedule-C)

$4,796

$55,914

$564,799

-$140,000,000

$50,900,000

Observations

295,652

Capital Income

Note: Gross receipts are negative due to firms electing to use accrual accounting methods.
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Table1.2
2
Table
Heckman
Selection
2-Step
Estimates
for Wagefor
BillSchedule
of Schedule-C
Business-Owners
Employing
Labor
Heckman
Selection
2-Step
Estimates
C Business
Owners
1992-2005
for the years 1992-2005
Columns 1and 3 display results from the Heckman Selection 2-step model for employment and wage bill responses to changing
tax rates. Column 1 displays the marginal effects from the first-stage of the Heckman estimation (a probit model). All marginal
effects in Column 1 are changes in the probability of employing labor for a one-unit change in the independent variable. A
current tax increase of 1 percentage point increases the probability of employing labor in the current period by 1.18%. All dollar
denominated variables are in $100,000s so a $100,000 increase in Capital Income, decreases the probability of employing labor
by 1.16%. Running another business, whether an S-corp or a farm, increases the probability of employing labor by 7.86% and
12.57%, respectively. For the second-stage presented in Column 3, all coefficients show the dollar increase in the wage bill for a
1 unit change in the independent variable, given the firm employs labor. Conditional on employing labor, a 1 percentage point
increase in the current tax rate decreases wage bills by $7678.47, reflecting the scale effect of lower production at higher
marginal tax rates. The positive coefficient on the future tax rate reflects the intertemporal substitution as labor and production
become relatively more valuable today and less valuable tomorrow when tomorrow's tax rates are expected to increase. A $1
increase in Depreciation Expenses increases salary expenses by $0.34. Mean and median elasticities are reported for each
specification. Controls for the marital status, number of dependents, and property taxes are also included. The Wald Test is
significant at 0.01%.

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Heckman
First-Stage
Coefficient

Standard
Error

Heckman
Second-Stage
Coefficient

Standard
Error

Current Tax Rate

1.18***

(0.04)

-7,678.47***

(538.44)

Future Tax Rate

-0.70***

(0.04)

8,707.42***

(491.92)

Capital Income

-1.16***

(0.06)

0.22***

(0.01)

Depreciation

25.70***

(0.20)

0.34***

(0.03)

Non-Schedule C Business Income

0.36***

(0.02)

0.03***

(0.00)

Other Businesses: Indicator

7.86***

(0.47)

-

-

Other Business: Farm Indicator

12.57***

(0.86)

-

-

Constant
Observations
Correlation Coefficient ( ρ )
Likelihood Ratio

-2.21***
402,554
-0.95
20,289

(0.08)

2,811,514***
402,554

(137586)

Independent Variables

2

R
Wald Test (prob>chi^2)
Observations

0.044
3734.9***
402,554

(0.00)
402,554

Wage Bill Current Tax-Rate Elasticity
Mean Elasticity
Median Elasticity

-0.17
-0.64

Wage Bill Future Tax-Rate Elasticity
Mean Elasticity
Median Elasticity

0.18
0.65

Note: All std. errors are adjusted standard errors. (***) indicated significance at 0.01%. Elasticities are average point-estimates that use the
mean or median salary expense, respectively.
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Table 1.3a
Behavioral Differences by Firm Size as Measured by Gross Business Receipts
The overall dataset on Schedule-C business filers is divided by the level of gross business receipts. Heckman estimates for observations with
gross business receipts under $250,000 are presented in Column 1 while companies with receipts of at least $250k but less than $3.5million are
in Column 2 and those with receipts of $3.5million and up are presented in Column 3. The three columns relay that differently sized firms do in
fact respond differently to personal income tax changes. Larger firms are much more sensitive to changes in tax rates than small firms. Larger
firms are also more likely to time production by intertemporally substituting away from producing in years of relatively high tax rates, as
evidenced by the positive coefficients on Future Tax Rates in Columns 2 and 3 for the second stage Heckman estimates. For permanent tax
increases (the coefficient on current marginal tax rate), small firms are dominated by the change in the relative price of owner-effort and actually
increase employment; whereas the decreased production by larger firms dominates the change in the relative price of owner-effort. The fourth
column re-states the findings from Table 2 in the overall model. The probit coefficients are marginal effects at the mean for current and future
tax rates. All columns include the standard controls for marital status, the number of dependents and personal property taxes. All dollars are
inflation-adjusted, chained 2005 dollars.

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Observations
Receipts < $250k

Observations
$250k ≤ Receipts
< $3.5m

Observations
Receipts ≥ $3.5m

All Observations

Current Marginal Tax Rate
(Std Error)

0.33***
(0.06)

1.25***
(0.01)

1.01***
(0.31)

1.18***
(0.04)

Future Marginal Tax Rate
(Std Error)

-1.29***
(0.06)

-1.57***
(0.00)

-6.66**
(2.97)

-0.70***
(0.04)

0.180
(0.22)

-0.17***
(0.03)

-0.04
(0.05)

0.36***
(0.02)

Other Businesses: Indicator
(Std. Error)

9.63***
(0.70)

-15.66***
(0.88)

-7.37**
(2.78)

7.86***
(0.47)

Other Business: Farm Indicator
(Std. Error)

10.51***
(1.28)

6.89***
(1.60)

12.13**
(4.42)

12.57***
(0.86)

(1)

(3)

(4)

Observations
Receipts < $250k

(2)
Observations
$250k ≤ Receipts
< $3.5m

Observations
Receipts ≥ $3.5m

All Observations

Current Marginal Tax Rate
(Std Error)

827.09***
(233.74)

-751.74***
(210.05)

-10,104.70**
(5117.24)

-7,678.47***
(538.44)

Future Marginal Tax Rate
(Std Error)

-2652.91***
(315.91)

1470.13***
(211.19)

7398.44***
(4818.91)

8,707.42***
(491.92)

Capital Income
(Std Error)

0.01***
(0.00)

-0.003
(0.003)

0.617***
(0.03)

0.22***
(0.01)

Depreciation
(Std Error)

2.19***
(0.04)

0.36***
(0.01)

0.370***
(0.06)

0.34***
(0.03)

S-Corp Business Income
(Std Error)

-0.01***
(0.00)

-0.001
(0.00)

0.078***
(0.01)

0.03***
(0.00)

0.937
0.019
286,437

0.086
0.033
102,949

-0.882
0.028
13,168

-0.953
0.044
402,554

First-Stage Probit:

Non-Schedule C Business Income
(Std. Error)

Second-Stage Regression:

Correlation Coefficient (ρ)
2
Pseudo-R
Observations

Note: (***) denotes significance at 0.01%, (**) denotes significance at 5% and (*) at 10%.
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Table 1.3b
Robustness Check: Cutting the Data by Firm Size,
as Measured by Gross Business Receipts
The elasticity estimates using the coefficients reported in Table 5a are reported for "small", "medium" and "large" firms, by gross business receipts, for all
observations in the 1992-2005 dataset. Larger firms are much more likely to employ labor than small firms and have wage bills that are more sensitive to changes
in current tax rates. Medium and large firms respond identically in magnitudes to increases in future taxes. Median elasticities are not reported in Column 1
because the median wage bill for small firms in the dataset is $0, which yeilds an elasticity estimate of 7.75 for both current and future tax rates.

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Observations
Receipts < $3.5m

Observations
$250k ≤ Receipts
Receipts ≥ $3.5m

Observations
Receipts ≥ $3.5m

All Observations

9.99%

66.29%

76.89%

25.00%

Mean Elasticity
Median Elasticity
Wage Bill Future Tax-Rate Elasticity

1.03
-

-0.03
-0.10

-0.08
-0.20

-0.17
-0.64

Mean Elasticity
Median Elasticity

-5.41
-

0.06
0.17

0.06
0.14

0.18
0.65

286,437

102,949

13,168

402,554

Probability of Employing Labor:
Mean:
Wage Bill Current Tax-Rate Elasticity

Observations

Note: Elasticities are average point-estimates that use the mean or median salary expense for the respective observations.
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Table 1.4
Elasticity Estimates for Specific Tax Reforms
Table 4
(OBRA-93 and EGTRRA-JGTRRA 2001-2003)

Elasticity Estimates for Specific Tax Reforms (OBRA-93 and EGTRRA-JGTRRA 2001-2003)
Subsets of the overall dataset on Schedule-C business filers are exploited to isolate the short-run effects of the 1993 tax increases
(OBRA-93) and 2001-2003 tax decreases (EGTRRA & JGTRRA) using the Heckman 2-step Model. Observations appearing in 1992-1994
surround the 1993 tax increases while observations in 2000-2005 surround the gradual tax decreases in 2001-2003. Mean and median
wage bill elasticity estimates for the respective tax increases (1993) and decreases(2001-2003) are reported. The elasticity estimates for
tax increases of 1993 are statistically different than the tax decreases in 2001-2003 for current tax rates but not for future tax rates. The
third column re-states the estimates from Table 2 in the overall model.

(1)

(2)

(3)

1992-1994

2001-2005

All Observations

29.78%

24.68%

26.57%

Wage Bill Current Tax-Rate Elasticity
Mean Elasticity
Median Elasticity

-0.47
-0.60

-0.27
-0.31

-0.17
-0.64

Wage Bill Future Tax-Rate Elasticity
Mean Elasticity
Median Elasticity

0.117
0.096

0.103
0.127

0.18
0.65

Observations

99,091

143,054

402,554

Probability of Employing Labor:
Mean:

Note: Elasticities are average point-estimates that use the mean or median salary expense for the respective observations.
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Table 1.5
Omitted Variable Bias: The Implications of Omitting Future Tax Rates when
Modeling the Employment and Wage Bill Responses of Small Businesses to Tax
Rate Changes
Table 4 compares a Heckman model with both current and future tax rates to a Heckman model with only current tax rates in
Columns 1 and 2, respectively. Including only current tax rates biases the marginal effect on employing labor upwards in the
first stage, as shown in Column 2 where a 1 percentage point change in current tax rates implies firms are 5.02% more likely to
employ outside labor. Excluding the future tax variable results in a positive coefficient in the second stage for the wage bill,
instead of the negative coefficient found in Column 1. Marginal effects and coefficients for the other independent variables
change little when future tax rates are excluded. Columns 3 reports the least squares regression using both future and current
tax rates and Column 4 is identical to Column 3 but excludes future tax rates. Column 4 is most similar to the methodology
employed by previous authors where the first stage is a probit model that is independent from the second stage least squares
regression on only observations with positive wage bills. The bias occurs from estimating the entire behavioral effect as
contemporaneous instead of decomposing the response to account for the anticipatory effect as well. Omitting future tax rates
as an explanatory variable induces an omitted variable bias that skews the interpretation of only the coefficients and marginal
effects of interest.

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Heckman
Current &
Future Tax Rates

Heckman
Current
Tax Rates

Least Squares
Wage Bill >0
Current &
Future Tax Rates

Least Squares
Wage Bill >0
Current
Tax Rates

1.18***
(0.04)

5.02***
(0.00)

1.18***
(0.04)

5.02***
(0.00)

Future Tax Rate
(Std. Error)

-0.70***
(0.04)

-

-0.70***
(0.04)

-

Constant
(Std. Error)

-2.21***
(0.08)

-2.20***
(0.08)

-2.21***
(0.08)

-2.20***

402,554

402,554

106,970

106,970

0.044

0.043

0.096

0.095

Current Tax Rate
(Std. Error)

-7,678.47***
(538.44)

925.81***
(199.6)

29.17
(50.18)

3357.63***
(193.84)

Future Tax Rate
(Std. Error)

8,707.42***
(491.92)

-

3409.02***
(460.93)

-

Capital Income
(Std. Error)

0.22***
(0.01)

0.22***
(0.01)

0.11
(0.08)

0.11
(0.08)

Depreciation
(Std. Error)

0.34***
(0.03)

0.35***
(0.03)

1.04***
(0.13)

1.05***
(0.13)

Non-Schedule C Business Income
(Std. Error)

0.03***
(0.00)

0.03***
(0.01)

0.01
(0.01)

0.01
(0.01)

Other Businesses: Indicator
(Std. Error)

-

-

38.74***
(5.13)

41,135***
(5184.39)

Other Business: Farm Indicator
(Std. Error)

-

-

-27.118***
(9.86)

-26,460***
(9882)

2,811,514***
(137,586)

2,796,106***
(137,700)

14,573
(18,373)

15,623
(18,414)

-0.95
20,289
402,554

-0.95
19,988
402,554

0

0

106,970

106,970

Independent Variables
First-Stage (Probit)
Current Tax Rate
(Std. Error)

Observations
2

2

R (Pseudo-R )
Second-Stage (Regression)

Constant
(Std. Error)
Observations
Correlation Coefficient (ρ)
Likelihood Ratio
Observations

Note: All std. errors are robust or adjusted standard errors depending on which is appropriate. (***) indicated significance at 0.01%, (**)
indicates significance at 5% and (*) denotes significance at 10%. The correlation coefficient is reported in Columns 1 and 2 for the Heckman.
least squares assumes a correlation coefficient=0 when a probit model is estimated for the first stage - the probit estimates are identical to the
first stage in the corresponding Heckman models.

48

Table 1.6
Specification Testing: Comparison of Heckman Estimates to Other Specifications
Column 1 re-states the second-stage estimates from the Heckman results reported in Table 2. Columns 2-4 present results from different
specifications of the model. Current and Future tax rate coefficients are reported in dollars and all other dollar denomiated variables are
reported in $100,000s. Columns 3 and 4 show the results from a standard OLS regression on all observations, even those not employing
labor and an OLS regression on only observations employing labor, the latter is the specification used in past research. Truncated OLS
does not account for any correlation between the employment and salary expense decisions. Standard OLS shows the mean effect of
increasing tax rates on the entire population regardless of if an observation employs labor or not. Mean and median elasticities are
reported for each specification. In Columns 1 and 2, we see that the additional restrictions added by the Tobit model lead to a reverse in
signs for the elasticity estimates. Additional controls for the number of dependents, marital status and property taxes are used in all
model specifications. The Wald Test is reported for the Heckman specification and is significant at 0.01%. The Tobit model is nested in
the Heckman 2-Step; a Likelihood Ratio test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the Heckman is the true model at 0.01%.

(2)

(3)

(4)

Heckman
2nd-Stage
Estimates

(1)

Tobit
Estimates

OLS
All Observations
Estimates

OLS on Positve
Wage Bill >0
Estimates

Current Tax Rate
(Std. Error)

-7,678.47***
(538.44)

6,810.47***
(493.2)

575.86***
(168.71)

29.17
(50.18)

Future Tax Rate
(Std. Error)

8,707.42***
(491.92)

-2,391.15***
(399.64)

649.14***
(161.00)

3,409.02***
(460.93)

Capital Income
(Std. Error)

0.22***
(0.01)

-1.08***
(2.26)

0.024
(0.02)

0.11
(0.08)

Depreciation
(Std. Error)

0.34***
(0.03)

1.34***
(0.05)

0.76***
(0.09)

1.04***
(0.13)

Non-Schedule C Business Income
(Std. Error)

0.03***
(0.00)

-0.02***
(0.00)

-0.003
(0.00)

0.01
(0.01)

Other Businesses: Indicator
(Std. Error)

-

70.113***
(4.35)

12.33***
(2.05)

38.74***
(5.13)

Other Business: Farm Indicator
(Std. Error)

-

79.321***
(6.68)

6.00**
(3.05)

-27.118***
(9.86)

2,540
(4,577)

14,573
(18,373)

Independent Variables

Constant
(Std. Error)
Observations

2,811,514*** -1,841,021***
(137,586)
(89,067)

Correlation Coefficient (ρ)*
Likelihood Ratio
2
R
Observations

-0.95
20,289
0.044
402,554

1
-1,721,643
0.006
402,554

-

0

0.066
402,554

0.096
106,970

Wage Bill Current Tax-Rate Elasticity
Mean Elasticity
Median Elasticity

-0.170
-0.637

0.148
0.521

0.013
0.046

0.001
0.002

Wage Bill Future Tax-Rate Elasticity
Mean Elasticity
Median Elasticity

0.178
0.647

-0.051
-0.192

0.014
0.051

0.072
0.265

Note: All std. errors are robust or adjusted standard errors depending on which is appropriate. (***) indicated significance at 0.01%, (**) indicates
significance at 5% and (*) denotes significance at 10%. The correlation coefficient is reported in Column 1 for the Heckman, the Tobit assumes a
correlation coefficient of 1 and truncated OLS used in previous studies assumes a correlation coefficient=0 when a probit model is estimated for the
first stage - the probit estimates are identical to the first stage in the Heckman model, refer to Table 2 to review. Elasticities are average point-estimates
that use the mean or median wage bill for the respective observations. The pseudo-log likehood is reported for the Tobit instead of the likelihood ratio
in Column 2.
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Figure 1.1 –The Effect of Tax Changes on Firm’s Demand for Labor
Figure 1.1 displays the optimal owner-effort and labor choices for any given sole
proprietorship. The value of the marginal product of owner effort is denoted by the
downward sloping curve labeled MP(e). The two full upward sloping curves represent the
after-tax marginal cost of owner effort under no taxes and then the critical tax rate (tc).
The upward sloping MC(e)/(1-t0) curve represents owners who only exert managing
effort, have zero labor effort, and employ outside labor. The horizontal axis measures the
total amount, or quantity, of owner-effort exerted through managing effort and labor
effort. The shadow price of owner effort is listed on the vertical axis.
Case 1: Firms with zero wage bills may employ outside labor after a tax
increase due to the relative price increase of owner-effort as a productive input. For any
given firm, there exists a critical tax rate (tc) such that t > tc implies L > 0. There is also a
second critical tax rate (t0) such that t > t0 implies eL = 0. As long as eL > 0, the firm
owner simply equates his marginal products of managing effort and labor effort [MP(em)
= MP(eL)] during maximization. But if L > 0, the owner equates the marginal product of
his labor effort with the competitive wage because his labor effort and outside labor are
perfect substitutes [MP(eL) = w]. It follows that there is a range of tax rates over which
all shifts of the after-tax marginal cost curve can cause a one-for-one substitution of
managing effort for labor effort (em for eL). Once t0 is exceeded, the owner does not exert
any labor effort; he equates his marginal cost of managing with the marginal product of
managing: eL = 0 and MC(e) = MC(em) = MP(em) > w.
Case 2: Firms with positive wage bills prior to tax increases are denoted by the
upward sloping MC(e)/(1-t0) curve. The firm owners only exert managing effort and
upon tax increases, the marginal cost of managing effort increases and owners spend less
time managing. Henceforth, all changes in employment and output are due to the scale
effect of reduced effort which reduces production. After the tax increase, the business
owner reduces his demand for outside labor, ceteris paribus.
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Figure 1.2 – Wage Bill Kernel Density Estimate
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Figure 1.3 – Kernel Density Estimate for Wage Bill > $5million, 1992-1994

0

Kernel density estimate

0

10000000

20000000
Salary_Expenses

30000000

40000000

kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 4.3e+06

5.000e-08 1.000e-07
Density 1.500e-07 2.000e-07

Figure 1.4 – Kernel Density Estimate for Wage Bill > $5million, 2001-2005
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Figure 1.5 - Historical Tax Brackets and Tax Rates
Personal Income Tax Brackets 1988-2005 for Married filing Jointly
1988-1990*
Marginal
Tax Rate
15.0%
28.0%
33.0%
28.0%

Income Brackets
Over
But Not Over
$0
$29,750
$29,750
$71,900
$71,900
$149,250
$149,250
-

1991-1992*
Marginal
Income Brackets
Tax Rate Over
But Not Over
15.0%
$0
$34,000
28.0%
$34,000
$82,150
31.0%
$82,150
-

2001
Marginal
Tax Rate
15.0%
27.5%
30.5%
35.5%
39.1%

Income Brackets
Over
But Not Over
$0
$45,200
$45,200
$109,250
$109,250
$166,500
$166,500
$297,350
$297,350
-

1993-2000*
Marginal
Tax Rate
15.0%
28.0%
31.0%
36.0%
39.6%

2002
Marginal
Tax Rate
10.0%
15.0%
27.0%
30.0%
35.0%
38.6%

Income Brackets
Over
But Not Over
$0
$12,000
$12,000
$46,700
$46,700
$112,850
$112,850
$171,950
$171,950
$307,050
$307,050
-

*Income ranges are listed for the first year and are adjusted for inflation in consecutive years.
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Income Brackets
Over
But Not Over
$0
$36,900
$36,900
$89,150
$89,150
$140,000
$140,000
$250,000
$250,000
2003-2005*

Marginal
Tax Rate
10.0%
15.0%
25.0%
28.0%
33.0%
35.0%

Income Brackets
Over
But Not Over
$0
$14,000
$14,000
$56,800
$56,800
$114,650
$114,650
$174,700
$174,700
$311,950
$311,950
-

Figure 1.6 – Anticipated Tax Brackets and Tax Rates 2001-2010
Proposed Changes in Tax Rates 2001-2010 (under EGTRRA 2001) for Married Filing Jointly
Tax Rate prior to July 1, 2001
Marginal
Tax Rate
0.0%
15.0%
28.0%
31.0%
36.0%
39.6%

Income Brackets
Over
But Not Over
$0
$26,350
$63,550
$132,600
$208,350
$288,351

$26,350
$63,550
$132,600
$208,350
$288,351
-

Tax Rate July 1, 2001 -2003
Marginal
Tax Rate
10.0%
15.0%
27.0%
30.0%
35.0%
38.6%

Income Brackets
Over
But Not Over
$0
$12,000
$46,700
$112,850
$171,950
$307,050

$12,000
$46,700
$112,850
$171,950
$307,050
-

*Income ranges are listed for the first year only.
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Tax Rates 2004-2005
Marginal
Tax Rate
10.0%
15.0%
26.0%
29.0%
34.0%
37.6%

Income Brackets
Over
But Not Over
$0
$14,300
$58,100
$117,250
$178,650
$319,100

$14,300
$58,100
$117,250
$178,650
$319,100
-

Tax Rates 2006-2010
Marginal
Tax Rate
10.0%
15.0%
25.0%
28.0%
33.0%
35.0%

Income Brackets
Over
But Not Over
$0
$14,000
$56,800
$114,650
$174,700
$311,950

$14,000
$56,800
$114,650
$174,700
$311,950
-

CHAPTER TWO
THE ELASTICITY OF TAXABLE BUSINESS INCOME AND THE WELFARE COST
OF PERSONAL INCOME TAXES ON THE EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS OF
SMALL BUSINESSES
1

Introduction
The existing small business literature pertaining to income tax changes estimates

the employment and wage-bill elasticity responses of businesses to tax changes. It does
not estimate or focus on the respective welfare costs of income taxes. The full welfare
cost of any tax includes many factors; some of which are difficult to quantify. A change
in the amount of owner-effort exerted affects the firm‟s demand for other productive
inputs like labor and capital. My analysis focuses on the marginal welfare cost of reduced
owner-effort and the owner‟s corresponding decrease in demand for outside labor,
relative to the previous income-tax regime.
I follow Feldstein‟s (1999) approach that proves the elasticity of taxable income is
a sufficient statistic for measuring the marginal welfare cost of an income tax change. I
estimate the marginal welfare cost of reduced owner-effort and the corresponding
reduction in reported taxable business income using the elasticity of taxable business
income for small business employers. The elasticity of taxable business income is a
sufficient statistic in estimating the marginal welfare cost of changes in taxable business
income with respect to tax changes. 59 The elasticity of taxable business income measures

59

As a sufficient statistic, the elasticity of taxable business income accounts for the owner‟s opportunity
cost (leisure) and changes in owner-effort exerted in the business of interest. The elasticity of taxable
business income also encompasses changes in reported business expenses, revenues and deductions.
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the long-run annual incremental cost of a permanent income-tax increase relative to the
previous income tax regime.
Small business employers also demand less outside labor when the owner exerts
less effort in the firm. When the demand for outside labor declines, displaced small
business employees enter a state of unemployment. All displaced labor in unemployment
must be absorbed by the rest of the economy before the new long-run equilibrium is
reached. I also estimate this short-run one-time cost of displaced labor because it is not
included in the estimate for the elasticity of taxable business income.
First, I estimate the long-run annual welfare cost of the 1993 and 2001-2003
personal income tax reforms using the elasticity of taxable business income in a
difference-in-difference analysis similar to the one performed by Feldstein (1995). I use
the cross-sectional NBER Public Use file on Schedule C filers (sole-proprietors) for the
years surrounding each tax reform. 60 This elasticity of taxable business income implies
that the marginal welfare cost of the 1993 reform is $920 million and the cost of the
2001-2003 reforms is $245 million. I am able to provide a lower-bound for these costs
using the median current-tax rate wage-bill elasticity estimate from the existing literature.
The current-tax rate wage-bill elasticity can serve as a proxy for the elasticity of ownereffort. This is the best estimate available for the elasticity of owner-effort which is just
one component of Feldstein‟s (1995) overall estimate for the elasticity of taxable

60

The NBER dataset is identical to the dataset used in Player 2011.
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income. 61 The wage-bill elasticity proxy implies a lower-bound of $168 million for the
1993 reform and $21.4 million for the 2001-2003 reforms.
To estimate the welfare cost of displaced small business labor, I utilize current-tax
rate wage-bill elasticity estimates for the respective tax reforms from Player (2011). 62
This cost is not zero because of unemployment search costs, labor market frictions, and
because the labor-supply curve is not perfectly inelastic.63 Because this cost applies to all
displaced workers, it could be quite large depending on the number of workers
unemployed. I estimate the instantaneous cost of displaced labor to be $10 million for the
1993 reforms and $3.2 million for the 2001-2003 tax reforms. The lower-bound for both
of these estimates is zero which would be the relevant welfare cost when displaced labor
is costlessly absorbed by the rest of the economy.

2

Income Tax Background
In 1992, Presidential Candidate Bill Clinton campaigned on a promise to raise

taxes on the wealthiest Americans. In the aftermath of Clinton‟s election, the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA-93) was signed into law. OBRA-93 increased
personal income taxes on Americans reporting adjusted gross incomes in excess of
61

The elasticity of effort is very difficult to quantify but the current-tax rate wage-bill elasticity from Player
(2011) provides a robust estimate for the scale effect that Schedule C employers undertake in response to
tax rate changes. The estimate provides a valid proxy so long as owner-effort and outside labor change
proportionally with respect to income-tax changes.
62
Theoretically, the total cost of transition includes two parts: the instantaneous cost of displaced labor plus
the costs required for labor to be gradually absorbed by other sectors to eventually reach a new long-run
equilibrium. I focus on the instantaneous cost because my data provide reliable estimates for the cost and
because estimating the absorption path depends on many of the parameters estimated in the labor and
unemployment duration literature. However, the estimates for the needed parameters vary across studies
and depend on many factors beyond the scope of this analysis.
63
If the supply of labor is perfectly inelastic, the welfare cost of the tax increase is zero because labor
instantly accepts a lower wage and is not displaced.
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$140,000.64 Married taxpayers filing jointly with AGI greater than $250,000 faced
statutory tax rates of 39.6% instead of 31%. Those with AGI greater than $140,000 but
less than $250,000 faced a statutory tax rate of 36% instead of the previous 31%. The
1993 tax reforms only affected the top-income filers and could have been expected with
confidence months in advance.65
Whereas OBRA-93 increased tax rates, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) lowered personal income-tax rates for most
taxpayers. Tax-rate decreases were expected to phase-in gradually through 2006. Rates
initially decreased to 39.1% from 39.6% for the top tax-bracket and were scheduled to
decline gradually to 35% over five years. 66 In general, each bracket rate decreased by half
of a percentage-point in each year. In an attempt to stave off recession, Congress and
President Bush passed the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) in
May 2003. JGTRRA sped up the tax decreases previously scheduled for 2006 to
retroactively take effect in the 2003 tax year. 67

64

OBRA-93 also repealed the cap on Medicare taxes, increased the taxable portion of social security
benefits, limited itemized deductions, increased Federal fuel taxes and expanded the Earned Income-tax
Credit (EITC).
65
The 1993 tax hikes were most likely anticipated in 1992 because the Clinton campaign focused on
increasing taxes on the top 1% of taxpayers (defined as AGI greater than $139,999). Furthermore, recent
research comparing treasury bonds with tax-exempt treasury bonds proposes that markets anticipate tax
changes often years in advance quite accurately. Poterba (1986) and Kochin and Parks (1998) provide two
independent studies. For a complete discussion, reference the literature on expected future tax-rates and
tax-exempt bonds.
66
See Figures 1 and 2 for comparison of anticipated and actual tax rates.
67
See Figure 1 for all relevant statutory tax rate changes.
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3

Past Literature
An income tax affects the production mix and tax-preparation of small businesses

in many ways. Business owners may reduce their own effort, and reduce their demand
for, and input-mix of, other productive inputs. A business owner may stop production and
shut-down operations entirely. Additionally, they may try to reduce their taxable business
income using legal write-offs and deductions (tax-avoidance) or illegal misreporting (taxevasion). Any deviation from the optimal production amount and mix due to taxation is a
welfare cost borne by society.
Researchers must identify the relevant counterfactual state-of-the-world to
accurately analyze the welfare changes given a tax increase. Harberger (1964) frames the
most prominent welfare cost approach; he measures the deadweight loss associated with
an economy in any given nonoptimal position rather than assuming the economy is in a
Pareto-optimal position before the distortion.
Feldstein (1999) proves that the elasticity of taxable income is a sufficient statistic
to measure the excess burden of income taxation. He shows that researchers can identify
the single elasticity estimate rather than focusing on all of the channels through which
taxes affect behavior (e.g. hours, effort, training, evasion and avoidance). Feldstein
(1995) employs a difference-in-difference analysis on a panel of Form 1040 tax filers to
estimate the elasticity of taxable income. He concludes that the welfare cost of an income
tax is possibly as high as $3 per $1 of tax revenue raised for high-income individuals. 68

68

High-income is defined as tax-filing households with adjusted gross income in excess of $250,000.
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Although the elasticity of taxable income is a sufficient statistic for welfare cost
analysis, Chetty (2008) argues it overestimates the excess burden of taxation. He shows
that some of the tax-avoidance behavior may be quantifiable shifts to other taxable areas
of the economy. Additionally, he argues that individuals may overestimate the true costs
of tax-evasion and tax-avoidance. Rather than focusing only on the elasticity of taxable
income, Chetty‟s welfare cost analysis is a weighted-average of the taxable income
elasticity and the total earned-income elasticity with respect to changing tax rates.
Income-shifting to other taxable bases probably occurs less for businesses because
business income has fewer margins for adjustment than adjusted gross income and is a
subset of adjusted gross income.
My analysis focuses on taxable business income which is one element of total
taxable income, and hence one component of the elasticity of taxable income. Many
authors have shown the elasticity of taxable income to be larger for individuals with
relatively high incomes and with positive business income. 69 Business income and asset
allocation are also significantly affected by personal income taxes. Feldstein (1976)
shows that marginal tax rates have a substantial effect on the shares of portfolios invested
in different types of assets. Although high-income individuals are often business owners,
the contribution of business income to the overall income elasticity estimate has not yet
been studied. This in an interesting area considering politicians typically care about small
business employment and small business contributions to economic growth.

69

The empirical literature on individual taxpayers has found the excess burden of taxation to be large for
income-earners in the top-percentile but relatively low for the rest of the income distribution. For a few
examples, refer to Lindsey 1987, Slemrod 1998, Gruber and Saez 2002, Saez 2004.
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Additionally, business income is known to constitute a large portion of adjusted
gross income. Feldstein calculates that 25% of adjusted gross income for individuals over
$200,000 is from unincorporated business cash flows and the percentage increases with
higher levels of income. I isolate the elasticity of taxable business income to show that
business income may be a large and elastic component of the overall measure for the
elasticity of taxable income.70 It seems that a substantial proportion of the behavioral
response to a tax change occurs at the business income margin rather than other margins
like wages, exemptions and personal deductions. 71
The existing empirical literature on small business tax-behavior estimates the
wage-bill elasticity with respect to current and future tax changes. The existing literature
does not provide marginal welfare cost estimates or policy implications (Carroll et. al
2000a LaLumia 2008, Player 2011). This paper offers such an estimate.
My welfare analysis includes an estimate for the cost of labor displaced from the
small business sector. The existing literature on unemployment duration and
unemployment benefits is vast and robust. I will simply review the theoretical
foundations and highlight several papers that are applicable to my study in the areas of
unemployment duration and unemployment insurance.

Unemployment

insurance

makes unemployed workers less likely to accept any given position and is a contributing
factor to unemployment duration. Because of unemployment insurance, workers who are
70

Giertz (2009) makes one of the few attempts to forecast tax revenues using the elasticity of taxable
income. He forecasts the impact of the Bush Tax Cut expiration in January 2011. Using various measures
of the elasticity of taxable income he predicts revenue collections will be between 12-62% less than the
mechanical revenue calculation when behavior does not change. The major driver of this result is the fact
that the Bush Tax Cuts affect every tax bracket and not just the upper income brackets.
71
This suggests either the supply of owner-effort is very elastic or that the level of reported business
income is relatively easy to manipulate, or a combination of both.
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laid-off experience a net loss in income that is less than the full decline in wages.
Henceforth, workers will be less likely to accept a new position when they are still
eligible to receive unemployment benefits. Welch (1977) and Ham et al. (1987) find a
positive relationship between unemployment compensation and unemployment duration.
Nickell (1979) estimates the probability of any given worker leaving unemployment for a
given state, conditional on being unemployed. He finds this probability increases when
unemployment benefits expire or are about to expire. In addition to unemployment
insurance, mobility costs and job-search costs also contribute to unemployment duration.
Diamond (1981) focuses on mobility costs while Salant (1997) focuses on the costs of
searching and matching.

4

Data
Data come from the NBER Public Use File on Individual Income-tax Returns

from 1992 and 1994 and 2000 and 2004. Each year of data provides a 10% stratified
random sample of unaudited and unamended tax returns. High-income households are
oversampled and there are no missing values in the dataset72. All upper-income returns
that are sampled at greater than 10% are sub-sampled at 10% to further protect taxpayer
identity.73 Cross-sectional data capture population changes over time and avoid the

72

For each year, all of the extreme value AGI filers are not included in the sample because there would be a
10% chance of selection for each filer.
73
For all filers with AGI greater than $200,000 several codes are completely removed: State Codes,
Alimony Paid/Received, and State Sales Tax Deduction. This applies to roughly 25% of firms employing
labor and 6% of firms without labor. Marital Status and number of dependents are also modified. For high
AGI filers, returns are further modified: the Schedule C fields for salaries and wages, state income-taxes,
and real estate taxes are blurred by multivariate blurred when two of the three categories have nonzero
numbers. Multivariate blurring is applied to each of the three categories after sub-grouping, the observation
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survival bias and mean-reversion associated with a balanced panel. 74 As shown in Figures
2.3 and 2.4, the distribution of Schedule C employers is changing over time with many
entities dropping out of the Schedule C filing status. This can be due to reclassifying as
another flow-through entity or discontinuing the firm‟s operations. Theoretically,
taxpayers in the cross-sectional model represent different taxpayers over the years but
they are assumed to behave identically, which is consistent with past empirical tax
research.
My analysis will focus on Schedule C data and taxpayer characteristics. 75 The
data reported on a Schedule C include the aggregate revenues, expenses and net income
from the business endeavors of sole-proprietors.76 Schedule C filers can, and legally
should, include “odd-job” income from individuals without formal business names or
practices. In 2007, 23.1 million returns included a Schedule C filing. 77 Schedule C
entities represent about 70% of all IRS documented businesses over 1988-2007.78
Taxpayers receiving social-security income are dropped from the dataset because
potential retirees may alter reported business income differently when faced with tax
is averaged with the two observations closest to it and then the field is replaced with the average value. It is
important to remember than one observation never contains the full content of the return and often includes
data from more than one return.
74
Feldstein (1995) uses a balanced panel of taxpayers appearing in both 1985 and 1988. Tracking
individuals over time has benefits but I will show that the distribution of Schedule C filers, particularly
employers, is changing dramatically over my time-horizon.
75
Schedule C data have limited personal characteristic variables; however, the data are rich in income and
expense variables.
76
Schedule C does not include data for S-Corporations and some LLCs. Single member Limited Liability
Corporations (LLCs) can elect to file a Schedule C. In 2005, of the Schedule C filers, roughly 450,000 were
registered LLCs. Multi-member LLCs are type of partnership and file a Schedule E under Partnership
Income.
77
If a taxpayer owns several businesses, a Schedule C is filed separately for each business.
78
C-corporations are included in the aggregate IRS business filings. The number of C-corporations drops
from about 12% in 1988 to 5.8% of all filers in 2007. The number of S-corporations rises from 6.6% to
12.5% for 1988 and 2007, respectively.
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changes than non-retirees.79 Observations with positive AMT80 liabilities are excluded
because they face different marginal and statutory tax rates than peer filers.81 I include
loss-entities in my sample because the losses are probably not random and contain
information valuable to the analysis. This is particularly true if reporting a loss-entity
becomes more attractive because of higher statutory tax rates.82
4a

Data: Summary Statistics 1992 and 1994
Unweighted selected summary statistics for the Schedule C employers83 are

presented in Table 2.1a for 1992 and 1994 and Table 2.1b for 2000 and 2004. Referring
to Table 2.1a, the average statutory tax rate for employers in 1992 is 20.6% and in 1994
is 23.03%.85 Whereas the average statutory tax rate rose due to the 1993 tax reforms,
taxable business income fell. Small business employers report average taxable business
income of $183,362 in 1992 and $178,917 in 1994.
Not surprisingly, Schedule C employers report much higher overall adjusted gross
incomes than the average population. The mean and median AGI for the 1992 sample are
$233,561 and $103,332, respectively. The mean and median AGI for the 1994 sample are
$215,134 and $102,799, respectively. On average, it appears that changes in taxable
business income account for roughly one-quarter of the changes in AGI reported over this
79

Approximately 4,000 observations are omitted in each year. This is consistent with the literature; leisure
may be less costly to retirees than non-retirees, in which case they will respond more acutely to small tax
rate changes.
80
AMT stands for “Alternative Minimum Tax”: approximately 2000 observations in each year, or 6% of
the sample used, are deleted because of the AMT.
81
Taxpayers with AMT liabilities pay a flat-tax and do not pay the statutory rates listed in the IRS tax
tables.
82
Omitting loss-entities may be more convenient when estimating elasticities because the data can be easily
transformed into natural logarithms; however, I prefer to keep the information contained in that data and
use levels.
83
I define an employer as a Schedule C filer with a positive wage bill.
85
All dollar figures are adjusted for inflation and stated in 2005 real dollars.
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period.86 Adjustments in taxable business income may be one important way Schedule C
employers are able to reduce their reported AGI and income-tax liability.
Mean gross receipts for Schedule C employers also decline between the two
years. In 1992 mean gross receipts are $1,451,427 and in 1994 they are $1,255,608. The
average wage bill for employers declined over the time period as well. It is $242,074 in
1992 and $200,589 in 1994. Conversely, self-employment income for employers rose to
$42,952 in 1994 from $39,987 in 1992.
In the 1992 sample, approximately 75.84% of owners report at least some of the
business proceeds as self-employment income. This percentage rises to 78.26% in 2004.
Schedule C filers employing labor account for roughly 29.88% of all Schedule Cs filed
with the IRS in 1992 and 1994.
4b

Data: Summary Statistics 2000 and 2004
Referencing Table 2.1b, the average statutory tax rate for employers is 25% in

2000 and is 19.94% in 2004. Employers report average taxable business income of
$202,045 in 2000 and $190,027 in 2004. Although average taxable business income
declined over the period, average AGI rose. The mean and median AGI for the 2000
sample are $633,431 and $150,216, respectively. The mean and median AGI for the 2004
sample are $782,642 and $115,622, respectively. Mean gross receipts for Schedule C
employers in 2000 are $1,921,972 and in 2004 are $2,087,495.

86

The total change in taxable business income is $4,445 ($183,362 in 1992, less $178,917 in 1994) and the
total change in AGI is $18,427 ($233,561 in 1992, less $215,134 in 1994).
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The average wage bill for employers rose over the time period. It is $293,102 in
2000 and $338,154 in 2004. Conversely, self-employment income for employers declined
to $43,939 in 2004 from $48,482 in 2000. In the 2000 sample, approximately 76% of
owners report at least some of the business proceeds as self-employment income. This
percentage dips to 70.39% in 2004. Schedule C filers employing labor account for
roughly 25% of all Schedule Cs filed with the IRS in 2000 and 2004.
4c

Data: Literature Estimates
Player (2011) uses the same NBER Public Use File for 1992-1994 and 2000-2004

to estimate a Heckman selection model for the small business wage-bill elasticity with
respect to changes in statutory tax rates. I utilize the Player (2011) current-tax rate wagebill elasticity estimates as a lower-bound in my elasticity of taxable business income
analysis. I rely on the Player (2011) wage-bill elasticity estimates again to estimate the
short-run cost of taxation before labor is absorbed by other sectors of the economy.
For the 1993 and 2001-2003 reforms, Player (2011) estimates the median currenttax rate wage-bill elasticity to be -0.47 and -0.27, respectively. The difference between
the two reforms could be due to the different natures of the reforms or a selection bias
over time. Chetty (2011) argues there are optimization frictions to changing one‟s
behavior in response to tax reforms. For small rate changes, like those in 2001-2003,
behavioral changes are relatively costly, ceteris paribus, compared to behavioral changes
in response to the sharp tax increases in 1993. Additionally, the fixed costs of changing
one‟s behavior in response to tax changes could be sufficiently large that the small
changes in the 2001-2003 reforms did not warrant substantial action. This is particularly
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true when individuals or businesses must make adjustments in discrete integers. One
example would be the decision to reduce employment; firms may be more likely to
reduce employment by one worker rather than by one-minute of work, or even one
hour.88
Another explanation for the differences between the two reform estimates could
be a selection bias away from the Schedule C status for businesses. The popularity of the
S-corporation rose over the time period because successful firms found the limitedliability structure appealing. The percentage of flow-through entities filing as Scorporations rose steadily between 1986 through 2004. The rules governing Scorporations changed under the 1986 tax reforms. 89

5

Welfare Costs Measures: Elasticity of Taxable Business Income
To estimate the long-run annual marginal welfare cost of a tax increase, I rely on

the elasticity of taxable business income. Feldstein (1995) proves the elasticity of taxable
income is a sufficient statistic to measure the deadweight-loss of taxation. Assume utility
is increasing in consumption and decreasing in effort; represented by: U(c,e). Business
owners produce output X using three inputs: capital, outside labor, and owner-effort; or
more simply X = f(K, L, e). Capital and labor expenses are tax-deductable business
expenses but owner effort is not. The owner will be taxed at the same tax rate regardless
of whether he pays himself a salary or extracts firm profits.
88

The median wage bill for employers in 1992 is approximately $242,074 which equates to 5-6 employees
when one assumes all employees are full-time workers earning the U.S. 1992 median income of $40,500.
89
The 1986 reforms reduced the filing restrictions on S-corporations, making it easier to incorporate as one.
See http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/bustaxstats/article/0,,id=152029,00.html for a full description of Scorporations and the percentage of flow-through entities filing as S-corporations over time.
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Taxable business income is represented by M where M = X – rK – wL.
Consumption is simply any business income left after taxes are deducted: C = (1-t)M .
This implies a direct connection between tax changes and changes in owner-effort and
therefore income from production. The cost of effort is increasing with output, income
and hence, consumption. I assume that owners are indifferent between exerting effort in
their firm and working (exerting effort) for someone else, ceteris paribus, because either
source of income would be taxed at the same tax rate.
The major distortion when effort or income is taxed through an income tax is the
owner‟s shift to the untaxed leisure market. 90 Any tax on effort is equivalent to a leisure
subsidy. A tax increase on business income induces owners to consume more leisure.
Additionally, higher tax rates may encourage owners to consume more of their salaries
and profits through tax-deductable expenses like travel, meals and entertainment.91
Increases in tax rates may also encourage owners to shift the timing of their
compensation to periods with lower expected tax rates, even if such periods are years in
the future.92 Higher tax rates may induce additional misreporting and tax-evasion.
The elasticity of taxable business income is the single best measure for welfare
cost analyses associated with business tax changes. Because of the envelop conditions of
consumer and firm optimization, the elasticity of taxable business income accounts for all

90

Retirees are excluded from the sample used for estimation because their preferences and cost of leisure
are probably very different from prime age workers.
91
Additionally, owners can partake in fringe benefits they provide for employees: on-site meals, daycare,
and expensive health and dental insurance plans.
92
Some fringe benefits like stock purchasing plans, retirement plans, and deferred compensation, allow
owners and employees to “time” their compensation.
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secondary distortions: elasticity of owner effort, elasticity of deductions, and elasticity of
compensation.
Implementing the standard Harberger welfare cost analysis, the welfare cost of an
income tax is:
,
or for a change in income tax rates, the marginal excess burden of taxation can be
written:
(1)
Where εTBI represents the elasticity of taxable business income, Δt2 represents the squared
income-tax rate change, and t0 represents the original tax rate.93 When owners cannot
alter their level of deductions or the timing of compensation, the elasticity of taxable
business income would provide a robust proxy for the elasticity of owner-effort. The
robustness of the proxy declines as the deductions and timing of compensation become
increasingly flexible.
In a one-sector economy the elasticity of taxable business income is the only
computation necessary to properly estimate the excess burden of a tax change. However,
in a multiple-sector economy, such as one with differential tax rates on corporate and
non-corporate income, further analysis may be required.

93

Equation 1 is a linear approximation; therefore, discrete and marginal changes are identical because the
discrete change is equal to the marginal effect multiplied by the change. Also, I am assuming that there is
no change in the price per unit used to generate income.
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6

Welfare Cost Estimation: The Elasticity of Taxable Business Income
The elasticity of taxable business income simply measures the change in reported

taxable business income associated with a tax change. This is one component of the
overall measure for the elasticity of taxable income that Feldstein (1995) estimates. The
elasticity of taxable business income may be upwardly biased and overstate the actual
welfare loss if business owners can shift assets to other taxable areas in the economy. 94
The true marginal welfare cost is the loss associated with the increase in leisure hours and
assets shifted to less productive untaxed sectors.
The flexibility of taxable business income depends on many things including the
flexibility of owner effort, deductions or expenses, the timing of compensation, and
capital investments. Additionally, the cost of altering one‟s behavior in response to tax
changes is most likely positive. Unfortunately, owner-effort is not directly observed and
many of the other flexible factors also depend on tax rates.
6a

Welfare Cost Estimation: Difference-in-Difference Analysis
I use the 1992 and 1994, and 2000 and 2004 datasets to directly estimate the

elasticity of taxable business income for employers. I estimate the respective changes in
levels for each cross-section and then use the average tax rate change to convert my
estimates to elasticity form. 95

94

Business owners are probably less likely to shift business income to other taxable bases in the economy
than nonbusiness owners because business owners are a subset of the overall population and have fewer
margins to adjust. For a detailed discussion, see Chetty (2011). Business owners could theoretically
restructure as a C-corporation and stop filing on the individual tax return entirely but this is unlikely past
1986 because individual tax rates are lower than corporate-tax rates.
95
My data are rich in income characteristics; unfortunately, all of the variables one would like to include on
the right-hand side of a regression are either jointly determined with taxable business income or are
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The 1993 tax reform increased tax rates on individuals with adjusted gross income
in excess of $140,000. I estimate the elasticity of taxable business income for all small
business employers and then subtract the estimates for the group of employers who did
not face any tax changes (Δt=0). This differenced estimate accounts for macroeconomic
trends over the period. A similar methodology is employed for the 2001-2003 reforms.
Table 2.2 presents mean and median estimates for the elasticity of taxable
business income for employers in the two years surrounding the 1993 tax reforms.
Columns 1-3 summarize the percentage changes in tax rates and taxable business income
for each level of adjusted gross income (AGI). Top income-earners, employers with AGI
of $250,000 or more, are denoted “High” in Column 1. Schedule C employers with AGI
greater than or equal to $140,000 but less than $250,000 in are denoted “Mid” in Column
2, and those with AGI less than $140,000 are labeled “Low” in Column 3. “Low” small
business employers did not face any tax changes during the 1993 reforms and provide a
benchmark for economy-wide trends which will be differenced out in Columns 4 and 5.
Differencing yields unbiased estimates so long as each group of employers is affected
equally by the macroeconomic trends.96 This is particularly important between 1992 and
1994 because the “dot-com” boom begins in 1993 and extends through the end of the
sample period. I want to account for the massive upward trend in production that is
independent from the tax increases.

endogenous. Examples include: depreciation, capital expenses, capital income, the existence of other
business income, and self-employment income.
96
This differencing would not eliminate a bias from business owners shifting income to other taxable bases
because only owners facing tax changes would shift any income. Chetty (2008) argues the elasticity of
taxable income overestimates the excess burden of taxation. He shows that some of the tax-avoidance
behavior may be shifts to other taxable areas of the economy.
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Column 4 shows that the elasticity of taxable business income is -3.29 for “High”
AGI employers and Column 5 shows the estimate is -5.39 for “Mid” AGI employers.
These estimates reveal that business income is very sensitive to increases in tax rates.97
For comparison, Feldstein‟s (1995) estimate for the overall elasticity of taxable income
ranges from -0.45 to -1.45 after I convert his net-of-tax elasticity estimates (ranging from
1.1 to 3.05) to tax-elasticities for comparison.98 The elasticity of taxable business income
for employers is two to six times larger than the elasticity of taxable income for middle
and high-income taxpayers.
The elasticity of taxable business income estimates for small business employers
during the 2001-2003 reforms are presented in Table 2.3. The 2001-2003 reforms
affected most tax-payers, with the exception of those in the lowest tax-bracket (10% in
2001 and 15% in 2003). The columns are similar to those presented for the 1993 reforms
with additional columns for low-AGI employers facing tax changes and low-AGI
employers not facing tax changes. Small business employers not facing tax rate changes
are still utilized as a benchmark for economy-wide trends over the period.
Columns 5-7 of Table 2.3 show the differenced estimates for “High”, “Mid” and
“Low” AGI employers. In Column 5, employers with AGI greater than or equal to
$250,000 have an average elasticity of taxable business income of -4.84. In Column 6,
middle-income employers have a mean estimate of -3.53 and Column 7 shows the
estimate for “Low” AGI employers to be -1.98.
97

Feldstein shows tax rates have substantial impacts on the asset portfolio choices of high-income
individuals (See Feldstein (1976) and (1997) for an in-depth analysis).
98
Feldstein‟s (1995) original elasticity estimates are based off of the net-of-tax rate: T = (1-t), instead of
simply the tax rate.
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The estimates in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 for the elasticity of taxable business
income show that regardless of tax increases or decreases, taxable business income
appears to be very responsive, particularly for high-income taxpayers. The estimates
range between -3.29 and -5.39 for employers with AGI greater than $140,000 and the
estimates are even more compact for the 2001-2003 reforms.
6b

Welfare Cost Estimation using the Elasticity of Taxable Business Income
Now that I have estimates for the elasticity of taxable business income, I use the

estimates to calculate the change in welfare according to Equation 1:
(1)
I first calculate the welfare change for each individual in my dataset and I then aggregate
the results for an overall sample estimate.
Table 2.4 shows the estimates for employers facing statutory tax changes in the
respective base-year. Small businesses not employing labor and employers not facing tax
rate changes are not included in any of the calculations. The marginal excess burden of
taxation is reported per employer in Column 1. Column 2 displays the estimate for the
base-year sample and Column 3 displays the estimate for the entire U.S. economy. The
differenced elasticity estimates from Section 6a for low, mid, and high AGI employers
are utilized to provide a range of estimates for the marginal welfare cost calculation.
For the 11,644 observations in 1992, the deadweight-loss per employer falls
between $7,907 and $12,961 and the total deadweight-loss for employers is $920 million
for the U.S. economy when the elasticity of taxable business income for high-AGI
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employers is used (-3.29) and it is $1.5 billion when the elasticity of taxable business
income for mid-AGI employers is used (-5.39).
The 2001-2003 reforms are not estimated to be as costly as the 1993 reforms,
primarily because fewer businesses are electing to classify as a Schedule C entity. The
per employer marginal welfare cost is estimated to fall between $4,065 and $5,567. 99
When I expand the 10% stratified random sample to the U.S. tax-filing population, the
deadweight-loss for the U.S. economy is $335 million using the elasticity estimate for
high-AGI employers (-4.84) and $244.5 million for the elasticity estimate for mid-AGI
employers (-3.53).100
This is the marginal welfare cost directly associated with reduced owner-effort,
and scaling back production due to the tax changes. The deadweight-loss from displaced
labor is not included in this measure. The difference in the magnitudes of the deadweightloss is attributed to the decline in the number of Schedule C employers between 1992 and
2000. If other flow-through entities respond to tax changes in the same manner and
magnitude as sole-proprietors, the economic losses will be much higher.

7

Robustness Checks using Estimates from the Existing Literature
After directly estimating the elasticity of taxable business income for each tax

reform, I compare my estimates with estimates from the existing literature. I first utilize
99

I do not specifically mention the “Low AGI” elasticity estimate of -1.98 to maintain consistency with the
1993 reforms where only tax-payers with AGI in excess of $140,000 experienced any tax rate changes. The
per employer marginal welfare cost associated with the -1.98 elasticity is $2,273.
100
As a reference point for the relative magnitudes of the welfare costs (gains), GDP in 1994, 2000, and
2005 was $8.9 trillion, $11.2 trillion, and $12.6 trillion, respectively. All GDP measures are inflationadjusted chained-2005 dollars. Recall that Schedule C filers represent around 70% of all business filers
from 1988-2007 and small businesses account for “roughly 50% of non-farm GDP each year” (Source:
www.irs.gov and www.sba.gov, respectively).
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the current-tax rate wage-bill elasticity estimates from Player (2011) as a proxy for the
elasticity of taxable business income. This estimate strictly proxies for the elasticity of
owner-effort and hence, serves as a lower-bound for the elasticity of taxable business
income. 101 Secondly, I compare my elasticity of taxable business income estimates to
Feldstein‟s (1995) estimates for the overall elasticity of taxable income.
I utilize the current-tax rate wage-bill elasticity to proxy for the elasticity of
owner-effort or the elasticity of taxable business income. The current-tax rate wage-bill
elasticity represents the change in a firm‟s scale effect. When firm operations are scaled
back, business income, or owner-effort will decline proportionally to wages. The validity
of this proxy relies on the assumption that any change in the demand for outside labor is
proportional to reductions in owner-effort. Assuming the wage bill and business income
are affected proportionally when scaling back operations, the wage-bill elasticity
estimates can be used to proxy for the reduction in taxable income due to reduced
production; hence, the permanent social loss due to tax changes. Utilizing this measure
also excludes any income that would still be taxed when it is shifted to another tax-base.
The Player 2011 wage-bill elasticity applies only to firms employing labor. Nonemployers lack the data needed in the computation because they have wage bills of zero.
The omission of data on non-employers leads to a downwardly biased proxy for the
elasticity of owner-effort. The respective median wage-bill elasticities are -0.60 and -0.31
for the respective 1993 and 2001-2003 tax reforms. These estimates are scale effects and

101

A proxy for owner-effort would also be appropriate when the elasticity of taxable business income
includes substantial income shifts to other taxable bases in the economy.
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report the percentage change, or contraction, in the wage bill when business owners are
faced with a 1% increase in statutory tax rates.
Table 2.5 compares my marginal welfare cost estimates from Table 2.4 to the
corresponding estimates when existing literature estimates are used to proxy for the
elasticity of taxable business income. All estimates are for employers facing statutory tax
changes in the respective base-year. The marginal burden of taxation is reported per
employer (or per firm employing labor) in Column 1. Column 2 displays the estimate for
the base-year sample and Column 3 displays the estimate for the entire U.S. economy.
Row III, for both 1992 and 2000, displays the marginal cost estimates when the
median current-tax rate wage-bill elasticity from Player (2011) is used as the proxy. The
current-tax rate wage-bill elasticity is the best available estimate for the elasticity of
owner-effort. Therefore, it can serve as a lower-bound for the marginal cost of taxation if
the only cost were due to reduced owner-effort. The 1992 per employer estimate of
$1,443 is much lower than the per employer estimate using the elasticity of taxable
business income ($7,907). Instead of a lower-bound, I can also think of this estimate as
isolating the cost of changes on a single margin: owner-effort. In 2000 the estimate is
$356 per employer for the elasticity of owner-effort. This is dramatically lower than the
estimate using the elasticity of taxable business income which is approximately $4,000.
The difference between 1992 and 2000 is most likely due to profitable sole-proprietors
(Schedule C filers) reclassifying as S-corporations.102

102

See Figures 3 and 4 for a visual depiction of the Schedule C wage bill data over time.

76

Rows IV and V utilize the estimates for overall taxable income elasticity from
Feldstein (1995). Hence the per employer cost in Rows IV and V is computed using the
same data on Schedule C employers but the elasticity estimate for overall income from
Feldstein (1995). For computation, Feldstein's reported net-of-tax-rate elasticities are first
converted to tax-elasticities for a proper comparison.103 In Row IV, Feldstein‟s “Highest
AGI” Elasticity of -1.45 yields a welfare cost estimate of $3,476 per employer in 1992
and $1,662 per employer in 2000. The elasticity estimate corresponds to taxpayers in the
top-income bracket (AGI≥$250,000). Feldstein‟s estimate is -1.01 for taxpayers with
AGI between $140,000 and $250,000 and is used in Row V. This proxy implies a
marginal welfare cost of $2,435 per firm in 1992 and $1,164 in 2000. All comparable
estimates in Table 2.5 are statistically different from each other.

8

Two-Sector Model of Labor Displacement
In a one-sector economy the elasticity of taxable business income is the only

computation necessary to properly estimate the excess burden of a tax change. However,
because owners reduce their demand for outside labor given a rise in taxes, there may be
additional distortions created in markets beyond those included in the envelope theorem
for the elasticity of taxable business income in a multiple-sector economy.
Labor is released from the small business sector and returns to the aggregate labor
market. The welfare cost of labor‟s transition into other sectors of the economy is not

103

Feldstein‟s (1995) net-of-tax-rate elasticity estimates of 1.1, 2.14 and 3.05 are approximately equivalent
to tax elasticities of -0.43, -1.01 and -1.45 when I use Feldstein‟s data to compute percentage changes in tax
rates instead of net-of-tax-rates.
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included in the statistic for the elasticity of taxable business income. However, the costs
of transitioning displaced labor can be bounded and estimated. At one bound, all of the
labor is perfectly and costlessly absorbed by other sectors in the economy and there is no
additional burden of taxation beyond the measure for the elasticity of taxable business
income. The excess burden of taxation is also zero when labor from the small business
sector is not suitable for substitution into other sectors, or when the supply of labor is
perfectly inelastic. In both scenarios, the wage in the small business sector must adjust to
maintain full employment.104 In this scenario, the change in the small business wage bill
would properly measure the tax-incidence borne by employees.
When the aforementioned scenarios do not hold, displaced labor enters
unemployment and is gradually absorbed by the rest of the economy. This adjustment is
transitional and is in addition to the costs from the elasticity of taxable business income.
The theoretical measurement associated with the transition decreases over time from the
upper-bound in the short-run and then down to the lower-bound (zero) in the long-run
once the new economy-wide long-run equilibrium is reached. In the short-run, the burden
of taxation will hug the upper-bound because labor market frictions and job specific
training delay labor‟s absorption into other sectors. As time passes, unemployment
benefits end105, new training can be undertaken by displaced employees, and firms in
other sectors have had time to optimally search for new hires. All of these factors push

104

Tax incidence is not discussed here but will provide a nice extension once each portion of the total cost
of taxation is estimated independently. In the case where labor is not substitutable between sectors,
employees will bear a large portion of an income-tax hike on their employers.
105
Unless you are one of the unemployed from the Credit Crunch‟s 2008 recession where unemployment
benefits extend for 99 weeks and you wager that your benefits will be extended further pending the 2012
elections.
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the estimate for the additional costs of taxation towards zero in the long-run. Even though
the point-estimate for the marginal welfare cost in the long-run may be small, the losses
are very real in the short-run and represent a direct reduction in production and wealth for
individuals and the economy. Assuming this two-sector economy has no other nonneutral
taxes, I can estimate the immediate short-run cost of displaced labor.
8a

Welfare Cost Estimation of Displaced Labor in the Short-run
Some small businesses layoff labor in response to income-tax increases. This

displaced labor then enters a state of unemployment. Eventually, the labor will be
absorbed by other sectors in the economy as the economy approaches a new long-run
equilibrium. To measure the instantaneous cost of displaced labor, assume no one finds a
new job in the first period (a week). At this time, the competitive wage has not had time
to adjust in response to the unemployed labor.
The initial movement is from labor employed before and after the tax change:
(L1 – L0) =

. Or,

∙ ηL,x ∙ εx,t

(L1-L0) =

, where ηL,x represents

the elasticity of demand for labor with respect to output, and εx,t represents the semielasticity of output with respect to the tax rate.
Once the wage adjusts, the amount of labor employed changes again: (L1-L2) =
.
Or,

(L1-L2) =

∙ ηL,w , where ηL,w is the elasticity of the demand for labor

with respect to the wage rate.
Combining the two, I get:
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-WCL =

(2)

=
=
And (
where

which equals:

,

which is: 1-εL,t∙ t

is the elasticity of labor with respect to the tax rate. The elasticity of labor with

respect to the tax rate is estimated by Player (2011).
So,

-WCL = t0wL0

t

Because the wage rate cannot vary in the short-run,

(3)

=0 and the welfare cost reduces

to:
WCL = t0 w L0

, where (w L0) is the bi-monthly wage bill. Utilizing the

mean and median wage-bill elasticity estimates from Player (2011), I calculate the firmlevel welfare cost for each observation in my 1992-1994 and 2000-2004 samples.
By definition, in the short-run, any displaced labor has not had time to be
absorbed by other sectors in the economy and wages have not adjusted. The
instantaneous cost is the first of the welfare costs associated with the economy‟s
transition to a new long-run equilibrium. The lower-bound for the short-run cost of
displaced labor is zero. The cost approaches zero the more quickly and costlessly
displaced labor is absorbed by the rest of the economy. It also approaches zero as the
elasticity of supply of outside labor becomes perfectly inelastic.
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Table 2.6 displays the sample level marginal welfare cost associated with labor
displaced from the small business sector due to reduced owner-effort in firms when taxes
rise. For the 1993 reforms, the per firm (or per employer) cost is around $87 when the
minimum duration of unemployment is assumed to be two-weeks.106 For the 1992
sample, this loss ranges from $796,822 for the mean wage-bill elasticity, to $1.02 million
for the median wage-bill elasticity. The per firm welfare cost of the 2001-2003 tax
decreases is approximately $54. For the entire 2000 sample, the cost is estimated to fall
between $280,735 for the mean and $322,326 for median wage-bill elasticity.107
Extrapolating to the U.S. tax-filing population, the 10% random sample equates to a
median cost of $10 million for 1993 reforms and $3.2 million for 2001-2003 reforms. 108

9

Estimates for the Total Welfare Cost due to Tax Rate Changes on Small

Businesses
To review, the elasticity of taxable business income sufficiently estimates the
annual long-run incremental cost of a permanent income tax increase on small
businesses. The elasticity of taxable business income encompasses the costs of changes in

106

Table 6 shows the instantaneous cost for the first two-weeks (bi-monthly) when labor is displaced. This
implicitly assumes a minimum duration of unemployed of two-weeks. The estimates can be easily adjusted
to account for different assumptions regarding the minimum length of unemployment (one week, one
month, etc.).
107
It is difficult to justify isolating the 2001 reforms from the 2003 reforms because the 2001 rate decreases
were expected to phase-in gradually through 2006. The entire tax rate change for both reforms occurs
between 2001 and 2003.
108
A more robust analysis would model and incorporate labor‟s absorption path into other sectors of the
economy. The dollar estimates from such an analysis would vary dramatically based on the chosen
magnitudes for variables like unemployment duration, the real interest rate, and expected inflation.
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owner-effort, business expenses and business deductions. 109 The short-run or
instantaneous cost to society when labor is displaced from the small business sector is not
included in the elasticity of taxable business income. This additional cost occurs when
employers change the scale of the firm, altering their own effort and demand for outside
labor.
Table 2.7 summarizes the main estimates of the paper. The high and low
estimates for the elasticity of taxable business income come from Table 2.4 which uses
the elasticity of taxable business income estimates from the 1992 and 2000 data on
employers facing income-tax changes. The instantaneous cost of displaced labor comes
from Table 2.6 where the mean and median wage-bill elasticity estimates from Player
(2011) are utilized to estimate the impact on labor when small business owners alter the
scale of the firm's operations. The high estimates are from the median wage-bill elasticity
and the low estimates are from the mean wage-bill elasticity. 110 The data are a 10%
stratified random sample; therefore, the cost borne by the economy is simply ten times
the cost borne in the sample.

10

Conclusion
I have provided two analyses to estimate the excess burden of taxation on small

business employers associated with the OBRA-1993 and JGTRRA 2001-2003 tax
109

When a large proportion of the change in taxable business income is due to shifts to other taxable bases
in the economy, the elasticity of taxable business income will overstate the true welfare cost.
110

The lower-bound for the short-run cost of displaced labor is zero. The cost approaches zero the more
quickly and costlessly displaced labor is absorbed by the rest of the economy. It also approaches zero as the
elasticity of the labor supply-curve becomes perfectly inelastic.
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reforms. The difference-in-difference analysis uses pooled cross-sectional tax return data
surrounding each respective tax reform to estimate the elasticity of taxable business
income which can be used to measure the permanent change in welfare. The elasticity of
taxable business income for the top income-tax bracket is -3.29, and it is -5.39 for
employers in the next highest tax-bracket in 1992. The estimate for the top income-tax
bracket is -4.84 in 2000, and it is -3.53 for the next highest tax-bracket.
Using my elasticity of taxable business income estimates, I calculate the excess
burden of personal income taxes on small business employers to be $920 million for the
1993 reforms and $244.5 million for the 2001-2003 reforms. The difference in total
marginal welfare costs between the 1993 and 2001-2003 reforms is attributed to the
changing distribution of Schedule C filers over time.
For robustness, my estimates are compared with estimates from the existing
literature for the elasticity of owner-effort (Player 2011) and the overall elasticity of
taxable income (Feldstein 1995). A proxy for the elasticity of owner-effort provides the
lower-bound for my welfare cost estimates. Secondly, the overall elasticity of taxable
income (Feldstein 1995) shows that business income does indeed appear to be more
elastic than other sources of income. This implies tax increases on business income will
yield little to negative revenue increases and will come with the cost of large deadweightlosses. For revenue generation, the government may want to target other sources of
income that are not as elastic.
I also estimate the cost of displaced labor when employers alter the scale of the
firm due to taxation. This cost is separate from the welfare cost associated with the
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elasticity of taxable business income. When labor supply is perfectly inelastic or
displaced labor is costlessly absorbed by the rest of the economy, the cost of displaced
labor is zero. I estimate the instantaneous cost of displaced labor to be $10 million for the
1993 reforms and $3.2 million for the 2001-2003 reforms.
Future research could focus on the selection away from the Schedule C, whether
all flow-through entities respond homogenously to tax changes, and identifying more
inelastic sources of adjusted gross income. 111

111

Feldstein‟s overall estimate for the elasticity of taxable income is approximately -1.45 which implies
some income sources must be less elastic than taxable business income. The category “wages, tips and
salaries” is probably a relatively inelastic source of AGI as evidenced by the many Federal taxes already
targeting wages: social security, Medicaid/Medicare, etc.
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Table 2.1a
Summary Statistics for Schedule C Employers 1992-1994
Variable

1992

1994

20.60%
28.00%
(12.28)

23.03%
28.00%
(14.22)

Taxable Business Income
Mean
Median
(Std. Dev.)

$183,362
$59,891
($603,821)

$178,917
$62,908
($544,498)

Wage Bill
Mean
Median
(Std. Dev.)

$242,074
$77,097
($802,238)

$200,589
$74,720
($472,857)

Self-Employment Income
Mean
Median
(Std. Dev.)

$39,987
$40,357
($33,709)

$42,952
$46,151
($34,523)

Adjusted Gross Income (AGI)
Mean
Median
(Std. Dev.)

$233,561
$103,332
($4,715,579)

$215,134
$102,799
($2,258,975)

Gross Receipts (Schedule C)
Mean
Median
(Std. Dev.)

$1,451,427
$553,019
($3,632,818)

$1,255,608
$522,564
($2,845,292)

$40,972
$11,149
($192,571)

$34,422
$10,516
($98,048)

14,800

7,304

Tax Rate
Mean
Median
(Std. Dev.)

Depreciation
Mean
Median
(Std. Dev.)
Observations

Note: The probability of any Schedule C filer employing labor in 1992 is
29.88%. In 1994 it is 29.59%. The probability of a Schedule C filer claiming
self-employment income is 75.84% in 1992 and 78.26% in 1994.
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Table 2.1b
Summary Statistics for Schedule C Employers 2000-2004
Variable

2000

2004

25.00%
28.00%
(14.77)

19.94%
25.00%
(13.66)

Taxable Business Income
Mean
Median
(Std. Dev.)

$202,045
$73,407
($650,114)

$190,027
$51,338
($1,110,137)

Wage Bill
Mean
Median
(Std. Dev.)

$293,102
$103,165
($989,346)

$338,154
$118,790
($834,768)

Self-Employment Income
Mean
Median
(Std. Dev.)

$48,482
$51,521
($40,787)

$43,939
$34,126
($41,849)

Adjusted Gross Income (AGI)
Mean
Median
(Std. Dev.)

$633,431
$150,216
($3,430,136)

$782,642
$115,622
($7,438,947)

Gross Receipts (Schedule C)
Mean
Median
(Std. Dev.)

$1,921,972
$677,960
($14,500,000)

$2,087,495
$792,138
($6,342,496)

$44,269
$10,779
($166,059)

$69,877
$13,172
($262,796)

7,474

7,380

Tax Rate
Mean
Median
(Std. Dev.)

Depreciation
Mean
Median
(Std. Dev.)
Observations

Note: The probability of any Schedule C filer employing labor in 2000 is
25.47%. In 2004 it is 24.01%. The probability of a Schedule C filer claiming selfemployment income is 76% in 2000 and 70.39% in 2004.
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Table
2.1c Bill Elasticity
Current Tax-Rate
Wage
t1 Wage-Bill
t2
Current Tax Rate
Elasticity
Salary%change(1993)

Salary%change(2001)
Mean Elasticity
Median Elasticity

1992-1994

2000-2004

-0.47
-0.60

-0.27
-0.31

Note: Estimates are from Player 2011. Elasticities are average
point-estimates that use the mean or median salary expense for
the respective observations. T he elasticity estimates for tax
increases of 1993 are statistically different than the tax decreases
in 2001-2003.
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Table 2.2
The Elasticity of Taxable Business Income with respect to Statutory Tax Rates for
Schedule C Employers for the 1993 Reforms
(1)
High

(2)
Mid
AGI≥ $140,000 and
AGI≥ $250,000
AGI < $250,000

(3)
Low

(4)

(5)

AGI < $140,000

High - Low
(1)-(3)

Mid - Low
(2)-(3)

% Change in Tax Rate
Mean

24.36%

14.93%

0.00%

-

-

Median

24.36%

14.93%

0.00%

-

-

Mean

2.39%

2.05%

82.47%

-80.08%

-80.42%

Median

-5.08%

-2.28%

7.31%

-12.39%

-9.59%

Observations (1992)

3,410

1,300

10,090

Observations (1994)

1,449

739

5,116

% Change Taxable Business Income

Elasticity of Taxable Business Income
Mean

-3.29

-5.39

Median

-0.51

-0.64

Note: High AGI represents employers with adjusted gross income greater than or equal to $250,000 in chained-inflation adjusted 2005 dollars. Mid
AGI represents employers with AGI under $250,000 and greater than or equal to $140,000. Low AGI represents employers with AGI below $140,000.
For the 1993 reforms, taxpayers with AGI < $140,000 did not face any tax rate changes. This does not include individuals facing a 0% statutory tax
rate.
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Table 2.3
The Elasticity of Taxable Business Income with respect to Statutory Tax Rates
for Schedule C Employers for the 2001-2003 Reforms
(1)

(2)
Mid
High
AGI≥ $140,000 and
AGI≥ $250,000
AGI < $250,000

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Low
AGI < $140,000

No Tax Rate
Change

High - No Change
(1)-(4)

Mid - No Change
(2)-(4)

Low - No Change
(3)-(4)

% Change in Tax Rate
Mean

-12.33%

-8.70%

-12.30%

0.00%

-

-

Median

-12.33%

-8.70%

-11.32%

0.00%

-

-

Mean

23.93%

-5.03%

-11.47%

-35.77%

59.70%

30.74%

24.30%

Median

11.17%

-5.26%

2.66%

-1.64%

12.81%

-3.63%

4.29%

Observations (2000)

2,190

819

3,007

Observations (2004)

2,091

436

2,670

Mean

-4.84

-3.53

-1.98

Median

-1.04

0.42

-0.38

% Change Taxable Business Income

Elasticity of Taxable Business Income

Note: High AGI represents employers with adjusted gross income greater than or equal to $250,000 in chained-inflation adjusted 2005 dollars. Mid AGI represents employers with AGI under $250,000 and greater
than or equal to $140,000. Low AGI represents employers with AGI below $140,000 but not in the lowest tax bracket because the lowest tax bracket did not have a rate reduction. Column 4 includes employers not
facing any tax rate changes with AGI below $140,000. This does not include individuals facing a 0% statutory tax rate.
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Table 2.4
Welfare Cost of Tax Reforms on Small Business Employers using Elasticity of Taxable Business Income Estimates
Table 4 shows the change in welfare cost from each tax reform which is computed using the Harberger analysis in
Equation 1, Section 5. The estimates are for employers facing statutory tax changes in the respective base year (not for
small businesses not employing labor or employers not facing tax rate changes). The marginal excess burden of taxation
is reported per employer (or per firm employing labor) in Column 1. Column 2 displays the estimate for the base-year
sample and Column 3 displays the estimate for the entire U.S. economy in the base year. The differenced elasticity
estimates for low to mid to high AGI employers are utilized to provide a range of estimates in the marginal welfare cost
calculation.

(1)
Per Employer
Elasticity of Taxable Business Income
Estimate for "High AGI" = 3.29
Estimate for "Mid AGI" = 5.39
Observations

$7,907
$12,961

Welfare Cost: 1992
(2)
(3)
Sample
U.S. Economy
$92,065,786
$150,917,514

$920,657,856
$1,509,175,141

11,644
Welfare Cost: 2000

Elasticity of Taxable Business Income
Estimate for "High AGI" = 4.84
Estimate for "Mid AGI" = 3.53
Estimate for "Low AGI" = 1.98
Observations

Per Employer

Sample

U.S. Economy

$5,567
$4,065
$2,273

$33,489,665
$24,452,476
$13,671,684

$334,896,648
$244,524,762
$136,716,840

6,016

Note: All figures are indexed for inflation and are 2005-chained dollars.
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Table 2.5
Lower-Bound Estimation and Robustness Checks using Literature Estimates
Table 5 compares my marginal welfare cost estimates from Table 4 to the corresponding estimates if other estimates are used to
proxy for the elasticity of taxable business income. Rows III display the marginal cost estimates when the median current-tax
rate wage-bill elasticity from Player (2011) is used as the proxy. The current-tax rate wage-bill elasticity is the best available
estimate for the elasticity of owner-effort. Therefore, it can serve as a lower-bound for the marginal cost of taxation if the only
cost were due to reduced owner-effort. Rows IV and V use the estimates for overall taxable income elasticity from Feldstein
(1995). Hence the per employer tax in Rows IV and V is computed using the same data on Schedule C employers but the
elasticity estimate for overall income. Feldstein's net-of-tax-rate elasticities are first converted to tax-elasticities for a proper
comparison. All estimates are for employers facing statutory tax changes in the respective base year. The marginal burden of
taxation is reported per employer (or per firm employing labor) in Column 1. Column 2 displays the estimate for the base-year
sample and Column 3 displays the estimate for the entire U.S. economy in the base year.

(1)
Per Employer
Elasticity of Taxable Business Income
I.
Estimate for "High AGI" = 3.29
II.
Estimate for "Mid AGI" = 5.39

Welfare Cost: 1992
(2)
(3)
Sample
U.S. Economy

$7,907
$12,961

$92,065,786
$150,917,514

$920,657,856
$1,509,175,141

Lower-Bound & Robustiness Checks
III.

Current-Tax Rate Wage-Bill Elasticity

$1,443

$16,805,785

$168,057,852

IV.

Feldstein "Highest AGI" Elasticity

$3,476

$40,473,933

$404,739,327

V.

Feldstein "High AGI" Elasticity

$2,435

$28,348,559

$283,485,587

Observations

11,644
Welfare Cost: 2000

Elasticity of Taxable Business Income
I.
II.

Estimate for "High AGI" = 4.84
Estimate for "Mid AGI" = 3.53

Per Employer

Sample

U.S. Economy

$5,567
$4,065

$33,489,665
$24,452,476

$334,896,648
$244,524,762

$356

$2,144,458

$21,444,584

Lower-Bound & Robustiness Checks
III.

Current-Tax Rate Wage-Bill Elasticity

IV.

Feldstein "Highest AGI" Elasticity

$1,662

$9,995,943

$99,959,433

V.

Feldstein "High AGI" Elasticity

$1,164

$7,001,311

$70,013,109

Observations

6,016

Note: All figures are indexed for inflation and are 2005-chained dollars.
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Table 2.6
The Instantaneous Welfare Cost of Displaced Labor from the Small Business Sector

(1)
Per Employer
Mean Wage Bill Elasticity
Short-run Welfare Cost

-0.47
$68

Median Wage Bill Elasticity
Short-run Welfare Cost

-0.60
$87

Observations

1992
(2)
Sample

2000
(5)
Sample

(6)
U.S. Economy

$7,968,222

-0.27
$47

$280,735

$2,807,353

$10,172,198

-0.31
$54

$322,326

$3,223,257

(3)
(4)
U.S. Economy Per Employer

$796,822

$1,017,220

11,644

6,016

Note: All figures are indexed for inflation and are 2005-chained dollars.
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Table 2.7
Summary of the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation on Small Business Employers:
Elasticity of Taxable Business Income & Displaced Labor
Table 7 summarizes the main estimates of the paper. The high and low estimates for the elasticity of taxable business income come from Table 4 which uses the elasticity of taxable
business income estimates from the 1992 and 2000 data on employers facing income tax rate changes. The instantaneous cost of displaced labor comes from Table 6 where the mean and
median wage-bill elasticity estimates from Player (2011) are utilized to estimate the impact on labor when small business owners alter the scale of the firm's operations. The high estimates
are from the median wage-bill elasticity and the low estimates are from the mean wage-bill elasticity. The data are a 10% stratified random sample; therefore, the cost borne by the
economy is simply ten times the cost borne in the sample.

1993 Tax Reforms
(1)
(2)
(3)
Per Employer
Sample
U.S. Economy

Marginal Welfare Cost

2001-2003 Tax Reforms
(4)
(5)
(6)
Per Employer
Sample
U.S. Economy

1. Elasticity of Taxable Business Income
High Estimate:
Low Estimate:

$12,961
$7,907

$150,917,514
$92,065,786

$1,509,175,141
$920,657,856

$5,567
$4,065

$33,489,665
$24,452,476

$334,896,648
$244,524,762

$87
$68

$1,017,220
$796,822

$10,172,198
$7,968,222

$54
$47

322,326
280,735

$3,223,257
$2,807,353

2. Instantaneous Cost of Displaced Labor
High Estimate:
Low Estimate:
Observations:

11,644

6,016

Note: All figures are indexed for inflation and are 2005-chained dollars.
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Figure 2.1 - Historical Tax Brackets and Tax Rates
Personal Income Tax Brackets 1988-2005 for Married filing Jointly
1988-1990*
Marginal
Tax Rate
15.0%
28.0%
33.0%
28.0%

Income Brackets
Over
But Not Over
$0
$29,750
$29,750
$71,900
$71,900
$149,250
$149,250
-

1991-1992*
Marginal
Income Brackets
Tax Rate Over
But Not Over
15.0%
$0
$34,000
28.0%
$34,000
$82,150
31.0%
$82,150
-

2001
Marginal
Tax Rate
15.0%
27.5%
30.5%
35.5%
39.1%

Income Brackets
Over
But Not Over
$0
$45,200
$45,200
$109,250
$109,250
$166,500
$166,500
$297,350
$297,350
-

1993-2000*
Marginal
Tax Rate
15.0%
28.0%
31.0%
36.0%
39.6%

2002
Marginal
Tax Rate
10.0%
15.0%
27.0%
30.0%
35.0%
38.6%

Income Brackets
Over
But Not Over
$0
$12,000
$12,000
$46,700
$46,700
$112,850
$112,850
$171,950
$171,950
$307,050
$307,050
-

*Income ranges are listed for the first year and are adjusted for inflation in consecutive years.
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Income Brackets
Over
But Not Over
$0
$36,900
$36,900
$89,150
$89,150
$140,000
$140,000
$250,000
$250,000
2003-2005*

Marginal
Tax Rate
10.0%
15.0%
25.0%
28.0%
33.0%
35.0%

Income Brackets
Over
But Not Over
$0
$14,000
$14,000
$56,800
$56,800
$114,650
$114,650
$174,700
$174,700
$311,950
$311,950
-

Figure 2.2 – Anticipated Tax Brackets and Tax Rates 2001-2010
Proposed Changes in Tax Rates 2001-2010 (under EGTRRA 2001) for Married Filing Jointly
Tax Rate prior to July 1, 2001
Marginal
Tax Rate
0.0%
15.0%
28.0%
31.0%
36.0%
39.6%

Income Brackets
Over
But Not Over
$0
$26,350
$63,550
$132,600
$208,350
$288,351

$26,350
$63,550
$132,600
$208,350
$288,351
-

Tax Rate July 1, 2001 -2003
Marginal
Tax Rate
10.0%
15.0%
27.0%
30.0%
35.0%
38.6%

Tax Rates 2004-2005

Income Brackets
Over
But Not Over
$0
$12,000
$46,700
$112,850
$171,950
$307,050

$12,000
$46,700
$112,850
$171,950
$307,050
-

Marginal
Tax Rate
10.0%
15.0%
26.0%
29.0%
34.0%
37.6%

*Income ranges are listed for the first year only.
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Income Brackets
Over
But Not Over
$0
$14,300
$58,100
$117,250
$178,650
$319,100

$14,300
$58,100
$117,250
$178,650
$319,100
-

Tax Rates 2006-2010
Marginal
Tax Rate
10.0%
15.0%
25.0%
28.0%
33.0%
35.0%

Income Brackets
Over
But Not Over
$0
$14,000
$56,800
$114,650
$174,700
$311,950

$14,000
$56,800
$114,650
$174,700
$311,950
-

1.000e-08 2.000e-08
Density 3.000e-08 4.000e-08

Figure 2.3 –Kernel Density Estimate for Wage Bill > $5million, 1992-1994
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Figure 2.4 –Kernel Density Estimate for Wage Bill > $5million, 2001-2004
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CHAPTER 3
THE VALUE OF RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: AN EMPIRICAL
REVIEW
1

Introduction
The trend towards residential communities with privately provided amenities and

services began after World War II and has continued over the past two decades.
Residential community associations (RCAs) include homeowners‟ associations,
condominium associations and cooperative associations. RCAs finance projects through
neighborhood fees that supplement or replace local government goods, services and
governance. Despite the rising popularity of RCAs, the associations tend to receive
negative media attention and have been scrutinized for exerting their rights to issue
punishment fees and place liens on member properties. 112
The high level of scrutiny is seemingly at odds with the fact that individuals in
RCAs originally chose to live there and signed all of the governing documents prior to
becoming residents. The existing RCA literature focuses on RCA efficiency, which may
have implications to guide court judgments. Theoretically, RCAs provide and price goods
and services that residents value when property buyers are fully aware of the effect RCA
affiliation has on property value. Differently sized RCAs could lend insight into how
agency costs change with the number of residents. RCAs with different voting systems
and by-laws could provide cross-sectional evidence of the value-added through lenient or
strict governance.
112

For examples, search the Internet for “HOA scrutinized”. In one example, a Texas HOA issued a fee to
an ex-military member flying the American flag. The state of Texas changed the legal scope of HOAs in
response to the case in late 2011 (Hiller 2012).
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I examine the sales prices of single-family houses for three Spartanburg County
RCAs and the sales prices for the RCAs‟ most comparable non-RCA neighborhoods. The
comparison of non-RCA data and RCA data allows me to examine the relative average
value of a RCA. RCAs appear to increase property values by 2.2% in my sample. I then
examine one neighborhood with 120 houses that has a mandatory homeowners‟
association for 30 lakefront properties. Homes in this particular RCA sell at a 3.8%
premium to the other homes in the neighborhood. This is the capitalized net benefit of
living on, and accessing the lake.
I also review and critique the existing empirical literature on RCA efficiency and
discuss the theoretical hurdles of applied research in the area. 113 I show that the existing
literature is downwardly biased because it omits a variable for the age of the property.
“Age” is an important variable to include because it proxies for many other determinants
of property value that are difficult to explicitly quantify. For example, the variable “age”
can proxy for location, architectural-style and quality, and projected maintenance costs.
A brief history of RCAs is presented in Section 2. Section 3 outlines RCA theory
and Section 4 discusses many of the problems with the existing empirical research.
Section 5 presents the empirical specification and the data are discussed in Section 6. I
discuss my findings in Section 7 and Section 8 concludes.

113

Langbein et al. (2004) and Agan and Taborrak (2005) are the only empirical papers on the efficiency of
RCAs, to my knowledge, at this time. In Appendix A, I revisit the Langbein et al. (2004) data, and include
a variable for condominium age. The inclusion of “condo age” erases all results of inefficiency reported by
the original study.
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2

RCA Background
Residential Community Associations began after World War II and gained

popularity in the U.S. during the 1950s and 1960s.114 Real estate developers recognized
the demand for inexpensive housing not available in cities. Suburbs with RCAs began to
develop, offering more and more amenities to entice people to leave the city and reside in
the “all-inclusive” neighborhoods.
A RCA provides a small segment of a city's total population with "public goods".
In a homeowners' association, public goods may include community rules and activities,
common area maintenance and landscaping, swimming pools, putting greens, and local
lobbying services. RCAs often perform some “local government” duties like snow
removal, sewage disposal and trash pick-up. Many of the first RCAs were essentially
live-in country clubs or retirement neighborhoods. RCA affiliation was the province of
affluence with the amenities to match.115
In the 1980s middle-income consumer demand for traditional housing substitutes
grew, and RCA developers responded. Nearly 100,000 RCAs were formed in the 1980s,
offering fewer amenities and services at lower prices to attract middle-income consumers
(Dilger 1991). The distribution of RCA diversity increased tremendously from the
original country clubs and retirement villages to a wide range of service bundles. Dilger
(1992) notes that by the end of the 1980s, “Residential community associations…ranged
in size and responsibilities from a few homes on a single street that collectively provide

114
115

See Dilger (1991) and Dilger (1992) for a full discussion.
See Dilger (1991) and Dilger (1992) for a full discussion.
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only one or two services to thousands of homes comprising a mid-size city such as
Reston, Virginia, that offers dozens of services.”
Over the past 15 years, the number and power of RCAs has grown. In 2008 there
were over 300,000 registered RCAs in the United States.116 In 2001, 50 million people in
the U.S. belonged to at least one of these small quasi-governmental organizations.117
RCAs are presumably a way to increase the utility derived from, and therefore,
the value of a property. RCAs operate under a set of “club-like” conditions with their
own by-laws and governance. RCAs have the legal power to place liens on residential
properties and foreclose on residents when the RCA by-laws are broken. These legal
powers help negate potential free-rider problems. A purchaser buying into a RCA wants
the association to be able to collect delinquent payments and fees so the unpaid portions
will not be shifted to the other fee-paying property owners.
A residential developer typically sets the scope of the RCA and the amenities it
offers. Because the developer initiates the RCA, he retains some, if not majority, voting
rights until about half of the property units are sold to individual owners or investors.
Initial research on RCAs was purely theoretical. In separate books, Tullock
(1970) and Foldvary (1994) argue that RCAs and other small local voluntary
organizations are presumably efficient. Foldvary (1994) performs three case studies of
decentralized local government activity in the United States.118 Alternatively, Helsley and
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Source: Community Associations Institute (CAI), http://www.caionline.org/Pages/Default.aspx
Individuals owning multiple properties could be members of several different associations. Source:
Community Associations Institute (CAI), http://www.caionline.org/Pages/Default.aspx
117

118

One of the cases is a condominium association in Alexandria, Virginia which is similar in location to the
associations studied by Langbein et al. (2004).
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Strange (1998) apply political and special-interest group theories to the theory of RCAs.
This is particularly due to the use of rent-seeking by board members. However, they do
not attempt to evaluate the relative efficiency of RCAs: RCAs may be inefficient
compared to a welfare maximizing equilibrium while being relatively more efficient than
an existing benchmark like the local government.
Dilger (1992) reviews RCAs in practice and their relationship with local
governments on issues like taxation, financing, and governance. On taxation, the issue of
the double-taxation of benefits arises: residents pay RCA fees and property taxes. Some
local governments rebate a portion of the property tax to account for the privately
provided services (trash/snow removal). 119 With respect to financing, Dilger (1992)
argues that if RCAs increase property values, local government tax revenues are
augmented because most property taxes are based on fair-market valuations. In this case,
RCAs subsidize activities that the local government would typically provide. Thus, the
local government may have a vested interest in the success of local RCAs.
Foldvary (1994) writes that the privatization of local government services by
RCAs is due to “unregulated private policy-making” and that “private communities unite
governance with market competition in the provision of public goods.” RCAs are a
product of Tiebout sorting and occur from the bottom-up, in contrast to the top-down
approach typically undertaken by larger government bodies. Local governments may be
forced to become more efficient to compete with private RCAs when the two forms of
governance offer similar products and services.
119

Additionally, even though local governments and RCAs provide similar services, property taxes are
deductible from federal income taxes whereas RCA fees are not tax-deductible.
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My focus in this paper is on the empirical value of RCAs for which the existing
literature has provided only preliminary results. Langbein et al. (2004) conclude that
RCAs are inefficient but do not produce convincing or significant results. They use
property values (condominium sales) to test the efficiency of RCAs, measured by the
association‟s fee level. They perform an old-fashioned hedonic pricing model without
accounting for selection and endogeneity. Extrapolating from their results, Langbein et al.
(2004) speculate that RCAs over-provide services or charge too much for the services
provided. They assert that RCAs face a greater oversight and management problem than
local governments.120
The second empirical analysis on the efficiency of RCAs is by Agan and
Tabarrok (2005). Analyzing a dataset containing observations both in and outside of
RCAs, they compare RCA property values to properties under the local government‟s
jurisdiction. They estimate that RCAs increase sales prices for members by 5.4% relative
to similar houses not under an association‟s governance.

3

RCA Decision-Making
Inefficiencies pertaining to group decision-making are expected to increase with

group size. In the absence of competition, a large collective body will be less efficient
than a small collective group of decision-makers. The relative inefficiency of a large

120

Langbein et al. (2004) also look at the relative efficiency of RCAs with more or less community
involvement and more or less professional management services. They find that higher RCA fees reduce
average property values and that professional management, as opposed to a community-run RCA board
“mitigates the property value losses due to RCA inefficiency”. Their results appear to show that
professional management constrains fee levels as well as the “over provision” of services.
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RCA to a small RCA, or a RCA to a local government, should be capitalized in property
values (sales prices). An association has two choices after collecting dues:121
The RCA can spend the money on goods public to the community and valued by
the residents. In this case, a cost-minimizing RCA operates like a firm and property
values (stock prices) increase relative to other neighborhoods, ceteris paribus.
Alternatively, after collecting dues the RCA or manager can throw the collections away
(or spend collections on services that are not valued by residents). Here, the lost funds
will be fully capitalized in the value of the property and property values under the RCA‟s
jurisdiction will decrease relative to other non-RCA properties.
Of course, any outcome between the two extremes is also possible. In the first
scenario, buyers are only willing to pay a premium for a property when the RCA is more
attractive than competitor RCAs (or local governments). The relative value of goods
provided is what determines the premium. In the second scenario, even if all RCAs
wasted the dues, all property values would still be observed to decrease by the entire
capitalized value of the dues, and there would be no difference in values across the
different RCAs.
3a

RCAs vs. Local Government Property Values
Assume two identical properties receiving one identical service: perfectly

homogenous trash removal. Trash removal can be paid for by city taxes or by RCA fees,
depending on the jurisdiction. This enables the researcher to examine property values

121

This decision-making process is virtually identical to a local government that collects property taxes.
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between the local government and RCA because the only difference between the
properties is the jurisdiction in which each exists.
With identical properties, location and services, any differences in property values
will be solely due to differences in the costs of serving (the taxes or RCA fees paid). The
difference in yearly taxes and yearly RCA fees will be fully capitalized in the present
valuation of a given property. If the property paying local government taxes is valued
more highly than the RCA property then the local yearly property taxes are lower than
the yearly RCA fees. The relative inefficiency is captured in market values. The reverse
is true when the RCA property is worth more than the local government property.
Theoretically, the value of a residential property, whether under the local
government or an RCA, or both, will be a function of square footage, the number of
bedrooms, the number of bathrooms, lot size, taxes, RCA fees, a dummy variable for the
presence of an RCA, property age, the location, and potentially the number of other
properties under the same local service provider (a measure of dwelling supply). 122 Taxes
or RCA fees could be replaced with the number of services provided, the quality of
services, delivery or administrative efficiency, and the number of houses in the RCA.
This comes from the mathematical identity that Total Revenue must equal Total
Expenses.

122

The number of units can also represent economies of scale in the provision of services. An RCA has to
reach some critical mass at which point it becomes less costly for the RCA to provide the service instead of
individuals or the local government.
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RCA fees and local government taxes are both functions of the quality and
number of services provided and administrative efficiencies and the number of properties
in the jurisdiction. When quality goes up, total spending on services increases.
Taxes or fees increase with increases in the number and quality of services
provided. Taxes or fees decrease with additional units up to the point of minimum
average cost and increases in administrative efficiency. When quality is increased,
holding taxes or fees constant, property values increase; furthermore, if administrative
efficiency is increased, ceteris paribus, property values increase.
When the number of services and quality are allowed to vary between the two
identical properties, the resulting capitalization becomes much more ambiguous.
Returning to the trash removal example, with different qualities between the RCA and the
local government, higher quality will increase property values while lower administrative
efficiency reduces property values. 123 The source of capitalization cannot be addressed
unless either quality or administrative efficiency is completely identified.
Given identical taxes and RCA fees, when RCAs have lower administrative
efficiencies compared with the local government but also have higher quality services,
the property values could be identical for two very different products, or the values may
differ but without proper controls we will not be able to separately identify the two
effects.

123

Quality can refer to the number of pick-up days per month, the distance between the house and the pickup location, etc.
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4

Problems with Empirical Research on RCA Efficiency
The empirical and theoretical problems for researchers empirically analyzing the

efficiency of RCAs include: identifying a comparable benchmark, local government
competition and joint decision-making, the number and quality of amenities provided,
and RCA and local government overlap.
The empirical researcher must be wary about the baseline chosen for purposes of
comparison. For instance, if all RCAs or local governments spend and tax with the same
level of efficiency, the tax will be fully capitalized in all real estate prices and no
comparative differential will be found. However, if RCAs are relatively less efficient than
local governments, only RCA properties will reflect the capitalized RCA fees (taxes).
When RCAs are relatively more efficient than local governments, RCA property values
should be higher than non-RCA properties. Empirical work with the Tiebout model
shows that in the case of inefficient taxation and spending, the lost value should be fully
capitalized in residential real estate prices (property values).
Econometrically, the comparison group is vital to the model. Interpreting the
resulting coefficients will depend on the relevant baseline group. Detailed knowledge of
the comparison group‟s characteristics will be necessary for proper interpretation and for
inferring policy implications. For instance, constructing a reliable benchmark is more
difficult for condominiums than single-family homes because most condominiums have
common areas subject to a property association.
In theory, the more RCAs in a given area, the more successful Tiebout sorting
will be, thanks to a wider range of choices over preferred services and amenity bundles.
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With greater imperfections in selection, the greater the discount buyers must receive to
“buy in” to a sub-optimal RCA or local government.
Furthermore, the comparison group, the local government, coexists with RCAs.
Researchers cannot observe local government decisions and efficiency levels in the
absence of RCAs. Local governments probably improve efficiency when faced with
competition from local RCAs. Local government behavior with RCA competition is very
different from that without RCA competition. This complicates determining the relative
efficiency of RCAs because the presence of an RCA can signal a “bad” local
government. In this case, the existence of an RCA is endogenous.
Local governments also compete with other local governments. Therefore, even
when a local government does not compete directly with an RCA, it competes indirectly
by competing with other local governments that do contain RCAs.
The researcher must be careful in both cases to control for services or amenities
offered by both the RCA and the local government. Some of the difference in property
values could be due to differences in amenities rather than differing administrative
efficiency. It may be the case that RCAs offer amenities and services that local
governments cannot. In these cases, the difference in valuation could be due to different
amenities or different management efficiencies. One example may be the restrictions
RCAs place on the aesthetic appearance of properties. Analyzing efficiency is
complicated further when local governments offer different services than RCAs.
The quality of amenities across RCAs and local governments varies. When RCA
quality is better than local government quality, people are willing to pay a premium for
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RCA amenities. Alternatively, when the price of the service is the same for local
governments and RCAs but there is some difference in the channel of distribution that
affects the quality (customer service, timeliness, less bureaucratic red-tape), any
valuation premium will be observed as higher property values.
Furthermore, many RCAs perform the duties of the local government, which
means some of the services and fees paid may overlap with local taxes and services. To
mitigate the potential for double-taxation, some RCA properties may not have to pay
100% of local government taxes because of the services provided by the RCA. Local tax
rebates to the RCA for sewage, snow removal and trash pickup are common. The correct,
or incorrect, pricing of these services layers another level of complexity and will at best
require simplifying assumptions.
4b

Problems with Existing Empirical Research
Ideally, any model examining the efficiency of RCAs would test whether the

presence of an RCA raises or lowers property values (sales prices) relative to not having
the RCA. Langbein et al. (2004) examine the effect of RCA fees on sales prices. Holding
RCA fees constant, the authors find that RCAs providing more services and amenities
have lower sales prices.
First, Langbein et al. (2004) use subjective board rankings of community
involvement (2001) to measure RCA citizen oversight. Theoretically, RCAs with more
active members will demand higher efficiency from management, so the management
will shirk relatively less than an RCA with inactive members. The Langbein et al. (2004)
community-involvement rankings do not include controls for the frequency of RCA
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services or quality, or how the RCA has changed over the past three years. Each board of
directors self-reports the survey data and it is not an objective or relative measurement for
community involvement.
Not only do RCAs compete with the local government for fee-paying residents,
they also compete among themselves. Any given consumer can decide to live under the
local government‟s jurisdiction or can choose from a multitude of RCAs offering various
amenities and fee-structures. The number and quality of amenities offered can change
over time and is probably influenced by the age and location of the RCA, competition
from other RCAs, and consumer demand. Without evidence to support a constant timetrend, the Langbein et al. (2004) results would be biased and inconsistent.
Second, the Langbein et al. (2004) empirical specification only includes RCA
fees, whether the developer or professional manager manages the property, a measure of
“community involvement”, the number of services offered, the square-footage of the unit,
the number of units in the property, and the 1999 assessed property value.
The authors fail to include a crucial variable: the age of the condominium at the
time of sale. This omitted variable will bias the result downward and could represent
some reverse causality. High RCA fees may lead to relatively lower property values, but
lower property values, especially due to the property‟s age, will induce higher RCA fees.
Older properties have higher RCA fees because future maintenance costs exceed the costs
required to maintain newer properties. Some of this expected maintenance cost will be
reflected in the individual unit‟s value but the costs of age will also be reflected in the
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projected costs of maintaining the common areas, which will then be capitalized in
property values relative to other condominiums.
Although the authors control for the base-year assessments, I do not think this
adequately accounts for differently aged properties. An older property may not increase
in value as quickly as a newer property or it may decrease in value more quickly. A linear
relationship between age and property value is probably incorrect. As shown in Appendix
A, including a variable for age reverses the Langbein et al. (2004) findings. Age can
proxy for location, architectural-style and structural quality, crime rates, and expected
maintenance.124 RCA fees are based on projected maintenance fees, as well as the goods
and services provided. If two properties are identical in every regard except age, the older
property will have higher RCA fees, and hence lower property values, when those fees
are capitalized into sales prices.
Furthermore, Langbein et al. (2004) assert that RCA's depress property values
relative to the socially optimum level; however, a more pertinent benchmark would be
the expected value of the property in the absence of an RCA. To reliably measure RCA
efficiency, one needs a benchmark for the alternative state of the world. The researcher
would like to know what property values are in the absence of the RCA, or before the
RCA was instituted.

124

Age can also proxy for the local government policies and services during a time period. This could make
the formation of an RCA more or less likely in some years over others.
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5

Empirical Specification
I would like to compare properties in RCAs to similar properties not in RCAs to

estimate the value consumers place on RCA affiliation. In most of my analysis, I will not
be able to identify the different sources of value (for example, aesthetic restrictions or
amenities provided). I estimate the following regression:
(1)
Where ln(Si) is the 2002-2005 sales price of property i in logarithmic form and
RCA is a dummy variable that is equal to 0 when property i is not in an HOA and 1 when
it is in an RCA. The X-vector includes variables for square footage, acreage, the number
of bedrooms, the number of bathrooms, and whether or not there is a garage and the
number of cars it can accommodate. I also include a variable for the age of the property at
the date of sale, age-squared, and year and subdivision fixed-effects in some
specifications.
Age is an important variable because it proxies for many different aspects of
property value. The age of a property can reflect the depreciation in value due to nature‟s
wear and tear, time, and technological innovations. 125 Age can proxy for the premium
often placed on period-specific architecture, design and superior craftsmanship. Age can
also proxy for the distance from the city center and the likeliness of being in a RCA. 126
RCAs are more likely to occur in the suburbs which tend to be outside of the city-center

125

Asbestos and lead-paint are not used in newer homes. Larger-diameter water pipes and higher-voltage
wiring are required by building-codes in more recent years.
126
Cities typically develop from the inside and sprawl outwards. The oldest homes are typically in the
center of the city.
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and relatively younger. To the extent age proxies for location, it may also proxy for the
ethnicity and diversity of the residential area. 127
Year fixed-effects allow me to isolate the aspects of sale prices not associated
with yearly housing-price growth and other macroeconomic factors. Subdivision fixedeffects allow for me to control for all of the differences between neighborhoods. In real
estate, the largest difference between such similar neighborhoods is usually location. 128

6

Data
My data comes from the Spartanburg County MLS dataset from 2002-2005. It

includes sales prices and other housing characteristics for three Spartanburg County
homeowners‟ associations and the non-HOA neighborhoods that are most similar. The
non-HOA neighborhoods were chosen based on their similarity to the HOAs in terms of
location, lot size, age, atmosphere and real estate comparables. The selections are
subjective but take into account which neighborhoods potential buyers view as
comparable. 129 All of the properties are in the same school district and the data includes
information on the number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, heated square-footage,
acreage, garages, the closing date of the sale, and the age of the property at closing.
The data include information on five neighborhoods: Arbours, Williamsburg East,
Oak Creek, Converse Heights and Andrews Farm. Converse Heights and Andrews Farms
do not have residential community associations. The Arbours community is one of the
127

This is particularly true if different ethnicities settled in certain areas within a small window of time.
“Location, location, location,” is the mantra of most realtors.
129
As determined and advised by Spartanburg realtors and HOA board members. Driving through each
neighborhood and HOA, one gets a feel for the level of comparability.
128
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larger community associations in Spartanburg with over 65 homes. The RCA offers a
community pool, tennis courts, walking trails, playground, trash pick-up, front-lawn
maintenance, community lighting and common-area maintenance. Their RCA fees are
between $60-70 per month.
Williamsburg East is another prominent Spartanburg RCA that includes about 35
houses and has by-laws governing lawns, house-siding and other aesthetics. The Oak
Creek neighborhood has a “mandatory HOA” for lake-front properties. The mandatory
association provides and maintains the lake for approximately 30 lakefront propertyowners. “Mandatory HOA” fees of approximately $450 per year maintain the lake and
keep it stocked with fish. Lakefront property owners are the only neighborhood residents
with access to the lake and fishing. All of the neighborhoods with and without RCAs are
in the same school district.
Table 3.1 summarizes sales prices for homes inside and outside of RCAs. Sales
prices are higher for non-RCA properties in the raw data. The mean non-RCA sales price
is $221,566 and the mean RCA sales price is $153,216. RCA properties have a lower
range and tighter variance than their non-RCA counterparts.
Selected summary statistics for properties not in RCAs are included in Table 3.2a
and statistics for RCA properties are shown in Table 3.2b. RCA and non-RCA properties
appear to be very similar in terms of the number of bedrooms, bathrooms and acreage.
Non-RCAs properties tend to be larger on average than RCA homes (2,525 heated
square-feet instead of 1,875 square-feet in RCA properties). In this sample, non-RCA
properties also tend to be much older on average than RCA properties. At the time of
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closing, the mean non-RCA property is 58 years whereas the mean RCA property is 16.2
years.

7a

Empirical Findings
The estimates from the dataset on selected Spartanburg County subdivisions are

displayed in Table 3.3. Columns 1 and 2 show the estimates when age and age-squared
are included and excluded. Column 3 includes variables for age and age-squared as well
as year fixed-effects. Column 4 includes both year fixed-effects and subdivision fixedeffects. RCA affiliation appears to have a positive impact on sales prices in Column 4 and
is estimated to increase sales prices by 2.2%. The average non-RCA sales price for the
dataset is $221,566; therefore, RCA affiliation is estimated to increase the value of the
property by $4,874 on average.
Although the estimates for age and age-squared are not individually significant,
the overall specification is significant. The specification with age and age-squared
outperforms the specification without the two variables in an F-test; it also outperforms
the specification with each variable individually. 130
The sign on age changes from positive to negative across specifications. This
provides insight into how age may proxy for different property characteristics in different
empirical specifications. In Column 4 subdivision is held constant. In this case, age is not
allowed to proxy for neighborhood and location. Furthermore, age is more likely to proxy

130

Including both age and age-squared outperforms the specification including only age, and the
specification including only age-squared.
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for physical deterioration instead of different architectural-schemes that could be
neighborhood-specific.
Depending on how consumers value different types of space, the value of a home
could decrease with additional bedrooms when square-footage is held constant because a
larger fraction of living space is devoted to bedrooms. 131 Increasing the square-footage of
a property by 1,000 square-feet increases the sales price by approximately 35%.
As shown in columns 1 through 4, acreage seems to act as a proxy for
subdivision.132 Acreage could continue to proxy for other excluded variables, particularly
the distance from the city-center, after subdivision fixed-effects are included which could
be the reason for the negative coefficient.
7b

Arbours Community Association
Table 3.4 displays the results of the analysis for the Arbours community

association. The Arbours neighborhood was built and established in 1993 and is most
comparable to the Converse Heights neighborhood which is not affiliated with a RCA.
Converse Heights is an older neighborhood with a mix of both old and new homes but the
two have identical school systems, are close in proximity to one another and have similar
community atmospheres. The Arbours RCA serves 65 single-family houses and the
Converse Heights neighborhood includes about 1,200 houses.
The Arbours community association appears to increase property values by 1.7%
relative to similarly situated properties in Converse Heights. Increasing the square-

131

This means less square-footage can be allocated to kitchens, bathrooms and living areas. Recall that
square-footage is “heated square-footage”.
132
I use the terms subdivision and neighborhood interchangeably.
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footage of a property by 100 heated square-feet increases the sales price by
approximately 10.5%. The sample size is relatively small and includes only 19
observations in the Arbours RCA which may explain the negative coefficients for
bedrooms and acreage. Furthermore, lot-sizes in Converse Heights are typically much
smaller than the Arbours neighborhood. Without subdivision fixed-effects, I believe
acreage is serving as a proxy for neighborhood and location. As displayed in Table 3.4, if
acreage were to double (increase by 100%) then the sales price is expected to decrease by
33%. The variables for age and age-squared are particularly important when comparing
newer houses and neighborhoods to older houses and neighborhoods.
7c

Case-Study: Oak Creek
The data on the Oak Creek subdivision provide a nice case-study on the pricing of

a single good. Oak Creek is a neighborhood that has a “voluntary HOA” for all properties
and a “mandatory HOA” for about 30 properties on the lake. The “voluntary HOA”
maintains the entrance to the neighborhood and about 90% of the 120 properties
voluntarily contribute the requested $100 per year. The mandatory HOA fees are paid by
owners with lakefront properties. These property-owners are the only neighborhood
residents with access to the lake and fishing. 133 Their fees of approximately $450 per year
maintain the lake and keep it stocked with fish. 134
Table 3.5 shows the results using Oak Creek sales prices for homes both in and
out of the “mandatory HOA”.135 Only lakefront property owners are required to pay
133

Access is patrolled around the lake and anyone without a proper permit can be cited for trespassing.
Lake maintenance includes the plumbing and drainage for the lake and dredging the lake when
necessary.
135
I am essentially evaluating the net premium of lakefront living for this lake.
134
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yearly dues to maintain the lake. The increase in property value due to the RCA is the
capitalized net benefit that property-owners attribute to living on the lake. The value of
lakefront property and lake-access is approximately 3.8% higher than non-lakefront
property. For the sample, the mean non-lakefront sales price is $175,000 which equates to
a capitalized increase in lakefront property values of $6650.136
The sample-size is small and includes only 19 observations, 5 of which are
lakefront sales. Notice that within a neighborhood, acreage is positive but because of the
small sample size, very few coefficients are statistically significant. Increasing the
square-footage of an Oak Creek property by 1,000 square-feet increases the sales price by
approximately 57%.

8

Conclusion
I estimate the average increase in property values from RCA affiliation to be 2.2%

in three prominent Spartanburg RCAs. This RCA premium ranges from 1.7% for the
largest RCA to 3.8% for the smallest RCA that applies only to lakefront property-owners
in Oak Creek. These estimates are similar to the findings of Agan and Tabarrok (2005)
that estimate RCA affiliation increases property values by 5.4% in Alexandria,
Virginia. 137 Some of the existing literature suffers from a downward omitted variable bias
because it excludes the age of the property at the time of sale. A variable for age is

136

This equates to an average perceived total yearly benefit of $650 and a net yearly benefit of $200 ($650
less $450 fees) when the interest rate is fixed at 3% indefinitely.
137
My estimates include year fixed-effects and the Agan and Tabarrok (2005) estimates include “age” but
do not include year fixed-effects and they do not report the implications of including year fixed-effects.
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important because it serves as a proxy for other less measurable determinants of property
value.
I also discuss the theoretical and econometric challenges of empirically analyzing
RCAs. When RCAs and local governments coexist, they compete with each other for feepaying residents. Hence, the sheer existence of an RCA could induce a local government
to become more efficient because it is no longer a monopoly provider of services.
Perhaps RCAs are simply the country clubs of the middle-class. RCAs provide
the means for middle-income citizens to purchase a bundle of amenities not possible at
the individual level. Such “luxury” goods in the club-like atmosphere provide gyms,
pools, putting greens – goods that are desirable for middle-income Americans but
financially difficult to purchase individually. Maintaining and purchasing a pool or
putting green is very costly individually but not as much in aggregate.
Theoretically, one would expect efficiency to increase with smaller groups of
collective decision-making. Future research could focus on the decision-making
efficiency of relatively small governing bodies in comparison to a local government
benchmark in the presence of dynamic competition between the two authorities. It may
be interesting to compare the strictness of voting rules and by-laws across RCAs to see if
more powerful RCA by-laws lead to higher property values than less stringent RCAs.
Future research may want to focus on RCAs as a form of “property value”
insurance or warranty. From the extended warranty and "Dutch Book" literature,
economists observe that some people are willing to pay for “peace of mind” and “onestop shopping convenience” in the insurance and warranties markets. A property owner
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cannot control who moves in beside him but an RCA can legally prohibit the new
occupant from doing anything that radiates negative externalities. In this case, fees are
paid each month to insure against losses in property value based on the maintenance of
other homes in the area and common areas.
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Table 3.1
Summary Sales Prices
Sales Price

Mean

Median

Minimum

Maximum

Observations

Non-RCA
(Std Deviation)

$221,566
(105,057)

$192,450

$69,900

$553,000

94

RCA
(Std Deviation)

$153,216
(62,861)

$132,250

$82,500

$410,000

32
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Table 3.2a
Non-RCA Summary Statistics
Variable

Mean

Median

Minimum

Maximum

Sales Price
(Std. Deviation)

$221,566
(105,057)

$192,450

$69,900

$553,000

Bedrooms
(Std. Deviation)

3.5
(0.80)

3.0

2.0

6.0

Bathrooms
(Std. Deviation)

2.5
(0.88)

2.5

1.0

5.5

Square-footage
(Std. Deviation)

2,525
(937)

2,487

763

5,748

Acres
(Std. Deviation)

0.19
(0.40)

0.0

0.0

2.30

Age
(Std. Deviation)

58
(25)

64

11

105

Observations

94
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Table 3.2b
RCA Summary Statistics
Variable

Mean

Median

Minimum

Maximum

Sales Price
(Std. Deviation)

$153,216
(62,861)

$132,250

$82,500

$410,000

Bedrooms
(Std. Deviation)

3.0
(0.78)

3.0

2.0

4.0

Bathrooms
(Std. Deviation)

2.4
(0.55)

2.25

2.0

4.5

Square-footage
(Std. Deviation)

1,875
(642)

1,685

1,050

4,125

Acres
(Std. Deviation)

0.21
(0.55)

0.0

0.0

3.1

Age
(Std. Deviation)

16.2
(4.55)

15.5

8.0

24

Observations

32
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Table 3.3
The Value of RCAs: Select Spartanburg County Subdivisions
Table 3 displays the results of the analysis for all selected neighborhood properties in
Spartanburg County. Columns 1 and 2 show the estimates when age and age-squared are
included and excluded. Column 3 includes variables for age and age-squared as well as year fixedeffects. Column 4 includes both year fixed-effects and subdivision fixed-effects. RCA affiliation
appears to have a positive impact on sales prices in Column 4. In Column 4, if acreage is doubled,
sales prices decrease by 5.11%. Depending on how consumers value different types of space, the
value of a home could decrease with additional bedrooms when square-footage is held constant
because a larger fraction of living space is devoted to bedrooms. Increasing the square-footage of
a property by 1000 square-feet increases the sales price by approximately 35%. A variable for
garage is included in each specification.

(1)

(2)

(3)
(4)
Age &
Age, Year FE
Year
& Subdivision
Fixed-Effects Fixed-Effects

Variable

Age
Omitted

Age
Included

RCA Affiliation
(Std. Deviation)

-0.66
(0.44)

0.34
(0.64)

0.37
(0.64)

2.20***
(0.81)

Bedrooms
(Std. Deviation)

-3.33
(30.90)

-2.10
(30.49)

-4.96
(30.97)

-2.89
(32.90)

Bathrooms
(Std. Deviation)

7.45*
(3.89)

8.70**
(3.88)

8.59**
(3.92)

10.59***
(3.80)

Square-footage
(Std. Deviation)

0.39***
(0.04)

0.38***
(0.04)

0.38***
(0.04)

0.35***
(0.04)

Acres
(Std. Deviation)

-67.31
(42.10)

-62.86
(41.61)

-63.23
(43.00)

-5.11
(49.47)

Age
(Std. Deviation)

-

3.72
(3.66)

3.82
(3.73)

-1.31
(5.00)

Age-Squared
(Std. Deviation)

-

-0.02
(0.03)

-0.02
(0.03)

-0.02
(0.04)

Constant
(Std. Deviation)

11.05***
(0.08)

10.87***
(0.12)

10.86***
(0.13)

10.67***
(0.14)

Observations

126

126

126

126

Adjusted R^2

0.823

0.829

0.826

0.842

Note: All standard errors are clustered by subdivision. Significance at 0.01% is denoted by ***,
5% is denoted by ** and 10% is denoted by *.
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Table 3.4
The Value of RCAs: Arbours Community Association
Table 4 displays the results of the analysis for the Arbours community
association. The Arbours subdivision is most comparable to the Converse
Heights neighborhood which is not affiliated with a RCA. The Arbours
community association appears to increase property values relative to
similarly situated properties in Converse Heights. Increasing the squarefootage of a property by 100 square-feet increases the sales price by
approximately 10.5%. The sample size is relatively small and includes only 19
observations in the Arbours RCA which may explain the negative coefficients
for bedrooms and acreage. As shown below, variables for age and agesquared are particularly important when comparing newer houses and
neighborhoods (Arbours), to older houses and neighborhoods (Converse
Heights). A variable for garage is included in each specification.

(1)

(2)

Variable

Age
Omitted

Age
Included

(3)
Age &
Year
Fixed-Effects

RCA Affiliation
(Std. Deviation)

1.40***
(0.10)

1.40***
(0.26)

1.70***
(0.52)

Bedrooms
(Std. Deviation)

-3.21***
(0.23)

-3.44***
(0.23)

-3.24***
(0.47)

Bathrooms
(Std. Deviation)

1.88***
(0.39)

1.93***
(0.49)

1.93***
(0.36)

Square-footage
(Std. Deviation)

1.05***
0.02

1.06***
(0.03)

1.04***
(0.02)

Acres
(Std. Deviation)

-74.85***
(11.65)

-69.95***
(5.44)

-33.82***
(17.99)

Age
(Std. Deviation)

-

10.00***
(1.62)

11.14***
(2.95)

Age-Squared
(Std. Deviation)

-

-0.06***
(0.01)

-0.07***
(0.02)

Constant
(Std. Deviation)

4.29***
(0.15)

3.80***
(0.16)

3.90***
(0.09)

86

86

86

0.872

0.877

0.880

Observations
R^2

Note: All standard errors are robust standard errors. Significance at 0.01% is
denoted by ***.
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Table 3.5
Case Study: Oak Creek Properties
Table 5 displays the results of the analysis for Oak Creek Properties. The Oak
Creek neighborhood has properties both in and out of the "lakefront" RCA.
Only lakefront property owners are required to pay yearly dues of $450 to
maintain the lake. The increase in property value due to the RCA is the
capitalized net benefit that property-owners attribute to living on the lake. The
value of lakefront property and access is approximately 3.8% higher than nonlakefront property. For the sample, 3.8% of $175,000 (for non-lakefront owners)
is $6650. The sample-size is small and includes only 19 observations, 5 of
which are lakefront sales. Notice that within a neighborhood, acreage is
positive but because of the small sample size, very few coefficients are
statistically significant. Increasing the square-footage of a property by 1000
square-feet increases the sales price by approximately 57%. A variable for
garage is included in each specification.

(1)

(2)

Variable

Age
Omitted

Age
Included

(3)
Age &
Year
Fixed-Effects

RCA Affiliation
(Std. Deviation)

3.50**
(1.30)

3.90**
(1.75)

3.80**
(1.49)

Bedrooms
(Std. Deviation)

6.84
(4.94)

6.92
(5.64)

11.55*
(5.27)

Bathrooms
(Std. Deviation)

1.04
(6.80)

-1.18
(5.12)

-2.81
(6.39)

Square-footage
(Std. Deviation)

0.50***
(0.11)

0.49***
(0.09)

0.57***
(0.11)

Acres
(Std. Deviation)

20.87
(12.84)

19.63
(12.46)

20.11
(13.13)

Age
(Std. Deviation)

-

-15.54
(88.79)

75.50
(85.06)

Age-Squared
(Std. Deviation)

-

0.39
2.50

-2.77
(2.50)

Constant
(Std. Deviation)

10.41***
(0.23)

10.64***
(0.73)

9.76***
(0.76)

Observations

19

19

19

Adjusted R^2

0.940

0.9363

0.955

Note: All standard errors are robust standard errors. Significance at 0.01% is
denoted by ***, 5% is denoted by ** and 10% is denoted by *.
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Appendix A
Replication of Langbein et al. (2004) Analysis
Langbein et al. (2004) claim that condominium associations in the Washington
D.C. area are inefficient and that property values decline as the number of RCA services
increases. Theoretically, after buying in at a discount, members could increase property
values with a simple vote that would be in every owner‟s best interest.
I

Empirical Specification
Langbein et al. (2004) estimate the following regression:
(1)

Where Vi is the 2000-2001 sales price of property i and ln(FEES) is the logarithm of
RCA fees for property i. The X-vector includes variables for the 1999 assessed property
value, RCA size, community involvement, vertical RCA governance, the number and
type of RCA amenities, square footage, number of bedrooms, and number of bathrooms.
After I replicate the Langbein et al. (2004) findings, I include a variable for each
condominium‟s age.
The variable for 1999 assessed property values accounts for theoretically static
factors effecting property values like the quality of the school district and the value of the
location among others. RCA size is measured by the number of units under the RCA‟s
jurisdiction. Community involvement is measured with a self-reported survey from the
RCA‟s management regarding the level of resident involvement in community
management ranked from “comatose = -3” to “hyperactive = +3”. Community
involvement can also be thought of as “horizontal governance”. Vertical governance is
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measured by the percentage of all RCA responsibilities run by outside professional hired
by the board. This percentage is self-reported on the same survey used to measure
community involvement. The number and type of RCA amenities are also from a selfreported survey where each RCA checks-off whether the particular amenity is offered 138.
The quality and frequency of amenities is not included in this measure.
II

Data
Langbein et al. (2004) use a small panel of 195 condominium unit sales in six

different RCAs to estimate the impact of RCAs on property values in Alexandria,
Virginia. The data includes two years of residential condominium sales data: 1999 tax
assessment values and 2000-2001 property sales values for six different HOA properties
in Alexandria. The Langbein et al. (2004) data come from Metropolitan Regional
Information Systems, Inc. (a multiple listing service used by realtors), the City of
Alexandria, and a questionnaire. It also includes survey data on HOA quality and
participation, some missing observations appear but the remaining observations are
thought to be reliable. For the analysis, I augment the Langbein et al. (2004) data with
one variable: condominium age.139
Langbein et al. (2004) interviewed a member of the RCA‟s Board of Directors to
obtain detailed information about the nature of each RCA. 140 The RCAs are the only
condominium communities in Alexandria, VA, a relatively small urban suburb of

139

The various condominium websites were used to verify each condominium‟s age.
Six RCAs were interviewed for the Langbein et al. (2004) study: 1) Watergate at Landmark Condominium Association, 2)
Colecroft Station Condominium Association, 3) Potowmack Crossing Condominium Association, 4) Stonegate Condominium
Association, 5) Parkfairfax Condominium Association, and 6) ParcEast Condominium Association.
140
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Washington, DC with a population of 128,000. It occupies less than 16 square miles and
is about 50 percent white, 20 percent black, and 15 percent Hispanic. Only properties
sold in the two-year period (2000-2002) are used and actual sales price is the measure of
property value.
The data provide variation over 1999 assessment values, RCA services provided,
condominium age and sales prices. More detailed characteristics that are not included in
the summary statistics chart include: square footage, number of bedrooms, bathrooms,
and specific RCA amenities and services provided. The monthly RCA fees range from a
minimum amount of $115 to a maximum at $602. The RCA fees are fairly standard
within a condominium community, differing based on square footage, but vary across
different condominium communities because of differences in amenities and services
offered and condominium age.
A large variation in condominium age (3 to 59 years old) can have a large impact
on HOA fees, as condominium age relates directly to maintenance and major repair work.
Obviously, the largest impact on sales price in 2001 is the assessed value in 1999, ceteris
paribus. The raw correlation between 2000-2001 sales price and 1999 assessed property
value is 0.78. RCA monthly fees are positively correlated with the number of services
offered and property value: 0.19 and 0.29, respectively. While the raw correlation
between the ln(property value) and the ln(condo age) is 0.36.
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Table A-1
Summary
Statistics
Langbein
et al. (2004)
Table 1: Summary
Statistics
fromfrom
Langbein
et al. (2004)
Variable

Mean

Minimum Value

Maximum Value

$138,321
($45,846)

$21,000

$310,000

RCA Monthly Fees
(Std. Deviation)

$252
($106)

$115

$602

% Professional Management
(Std. Deviation)

86.15
(25.3)

40

100

Community Involvement
(Std. Deviation)

-0.07
(1.34)

-3

2

Number of Services
(Std. Deviation)

9.38
(1.12)

5

10

Number of Units in RCA
(Std. Deviation)

1059.8
(705.9)

110

1,684

$40,200

$202,600

3

59

Property Value 2000-2001
(Std. Deviation)

Assessed Property Value (1999) $89,116
(Std. Deviation)
($31,206)
Condo Age in Years at 2001
(Std. Deviation)

III

40.98
(23.63)

Results
I first revisit the Langbein et al. (2004) study and replicate their regression model.

Due to multicollinearity and differences in standard error methods, I was never able to
perfectly replicate the Langbein et al. (2004) findings; however, my replication results
were very similar. After replicating the authors‟ method, I add a variable for
condominium age to the regression.
With the additional variable for condominium age, I observe the results listed in
Table A-2. The inclusion of “condo age” reverses the findings of Langbein et al. (2004)
and estimates that increasing RCA fees leads to a statistically insignificant increase in
sales price. Including “condo age” absorbs all of the variation Langbein et al. (2004) were
reporting as RCA inefficiency. As shown in Table A-2, increasing the condominium‟s
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age by one year, decreases property values by about $500 – something beyond the control
of anyone, let alone the RCA. From this analysis, I cannot conclude that RCAs depress
property values. No conclusions can be drawn with regard to comparative efficiency
without a reliable benchmark.
Furthermore, even after including the “condo age” variable, the analysis still finds
that property values decline with increases in services. This conflicts with economic
intuition which would encourage RCA members to reduce services to the point where the
marginal cost of each is equal to the marginal benefit.
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A-2
Langbein et al. (2004)Table
Findings vs.
Variable for Condo Age
Langbein et al. (2004)RCAs
Estimates
vs.Values
Variable for Condo Age
and Property
Alexandria, Virginia

Variable
Log RCA Fee
(Std. Error)
Log Services
(Std. Error)
Management (Vertical/Horizontal)
(Std. Error)
Log(Management (Vertical/Horizontal))
(Std. Error)
Log Square Feet
(Std. Error)
Log Number Units
(Std. Error)
Log 1999 Assessed Value
(Std. Error)
Condo Age
(Std. Error)
RCA1(Parkfairfax)
(Std. Error)
RCA2(Stonegate)
(Std. Error)
RCA3(ParcEast)
(Std. Error)
RCA4 (Potowmack)
(Std. Error)
RCA(Colecroft)
(Std. Error)
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(1)
Controls for
Management

(2)
Controls for
Log(Management)
and Services

(3)
Controls for
Management
and Log(Services)

(4)
Controls for
Log(Management)
and Services

(5)
Dummy
Variables

(6)
Variable for
Condo Age

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

-0.26
(0.001)**
-

-0.21
(0.005)**
-

-0.13
(0.101)**
-0.40
(0.007)**
-

-

.0025
(0.001)**
-

-0.18
(0.022)**
-0.52
(0.002)**
0.003
(0.001)**
-

-

0.59
(0.001)**
0.19
(0.001)**
0.51
(0.001)**
-

0.11
(0.001)**
0.55
(0.001)**
0.15
(0.001)**
0.50
(0.001)**
-

0.0286
(0.0797)
-0.5070
(0.1365)**
-0.0026
(0.0009)**
-

-

0.67
(0.001)**
0.140
(0.001)**
0.520
(0.001)**
-

0.11
(0.001)**
0.65
(0.001)**
0.11
(0.001)**
0.50
(0.001)**
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-0.20
(0.001)**
0.12
(0.263)
0.22
(0.079)
-0.21
(0.04)**
Dropped

1.66
(0.001)**
195

1.710
(0.001)**
195

2.75
(0.001)**
195

2.59
(0.001)**
195

1.77
(0.013)**
195

2.677
(0.610)**
195

0.70

0.75

0.85

0.85

0.92

0.73

*Indicates significance at 5%; ** indicates significance at 1%.
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0.51
(0.001)**
0.12
(0.0022)**
0.51
(0.001)**
-

0.4256
(0.1578)**

-0.0080
(0.001)**
-
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